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ABSTRACT 
 
I investigate whether U.S. bank holding companies choose early adoption of accounting 
standards to better access external financing. Both economic intuition and theories suggest that 
banks are motivated to take measures such as information disclosure to better access capital 
markets. Examining accounting standards from January 1995 to March 2008 that allowed for 
early adoption, I find that banks with lower profitability and higher risk profiles are more likely 
to choose early adoption. This evidence is consistent with a bank’s incentive to better access 
external financing. In addition, the results suggest a counter-signaling effect of early-adoption 
decisions. I further find that banks are more likely to choose early adoption for the purpose of 
having better access to external financing when the income effects of accounting standards are ex 
ante undetermined or when only disclosures are required. I provide evidence that banks vary 
their early-adoption decisions according to several accounting standard characteristics, such as 
the income effects of accounting standards, standard type (financial versus non-financial), and 
standard complexity. Finally, early adopters generally experience higher fund growth than 
matched late adopters during economic expansions when banks are most motivated to attract 
more funds.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Early adoption of accounting standards (hereafter, early adoption) is an area that has been 
investigated by several research studies. These studies have focused on different reasons behind 
early adoption that encompass both contracting and information disclosure paradigms. Under the 
contracting paradigm, the reasons found to be associated with early-adoption decisions include 
maximizing accounting-based compensation bonuses, avoiding violations of debt covenants, and 
minimizing political costs (e.g., Ayres 1986; Scott 1991; Sami and Welsh 1992; Ali and Kumar 
1994). Under the information disclosure paradigm, Amir and Ziv (1997a, b) provide evidence 
that early adoption can be an information signal to capital markets. They theoretically and 
empirically show that managers use both early adoption and financial statement recognition to 
disclose favorable information about previously unreported post-retirement liabilities. In addition, 
they find that these firms experience a positive stock market reaction to their early-adoption 
announcements, a finding consistent with managers choosing to early adopt the standard to 
reveal low post-retirement liabilities relative to the market’s expectation. None of the studies 
mentioned above include financial firms in their analysis, because these firms are regulated and 
have radically different operations from non-financial firms (Scott 1991). Thus, early adoption 
by banks is a largely un-researched area. 
I attempt to fill the gap by examining early-adoption decisions of U.S. bank holding 
companies (hereafter, BHCs or banks) on accounting standards, issued in the period from 
January 1995 to March 2008 which allowed for early adoption.1 Economic intuition and theories 
suggest that a crucial determinant of a bank’s performance is its access to financing. 
Theoretically, information disclosure has been associated with better access to capital markets 
(see Healy and Palepu (2001) for a review). I extend the information disclosure paradigm further 
by investigating whether the incentive to better access external financing is a motivation for 
banks to early adopt accounting standards. To my knowledge, this motivation has not yet been 
investigated in the early adoption context. As such, it is appealing to study whether the external-
                                                 
1
 A bank holding company is defined as “A company that owns and/or controls one or more U.S. banks or one that 
owns, or has controlling interest in, one or more banks. A bank holding company may also own another bank 
holding company, which in turn owns or controls a bank.” (source: http://www.ffiec.gov/) The choice of the sample 
period is discussed in footnote 13.  
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financing motivation is important in explaining a bank’s early-adoption decisions because early 
adoption is a form of information disclosure where new information is revealed through 
recognition and/or disclosure. In addition, the majority of the accounting standard 
pronouncements allowing for early adoption during 1995-2008 were related to financial 
instruments. Because financial instruments are extensively used in banking activities, the 
banking industry is an ideal sample to study the early adoption of these accounting 
pronouncements.  
To date, Beatty (1995) is the only paper that examines BHCs’ early-adoption decisions. 
She finds that a bank’s motivation to increase regulatory capital is important in explaining its 
decision to early adopt SFAS No. 115, which deals with accounting for investment securities. 
My study adds to Beatty (1995) in the following ways. First, Beatty examines whether banks 
early adopt to increase their regulatory capital through unrealized gains in investment securities 
portfolios. In contrast, this study investigates whether banks early adopt accounting standards to 
disclose information and thus to better access external financing in the form of either debt or 
equity capital. Second, this study investigates several accounting standards that allow for early 
adoption, whereas Beatty (1995) and prior studies examine only one standard at a time. The 
multiple-standards setting enables me to examine whether the income effects of accounting 
standards and standard-specific characteristics influence banks’ decisions to early adopt.2 
Raising funds in capital markets is essential to banks, yet not all banks choose to early 
adopt during the sample period of this study. This observation suggests that banks vary in their 
capability/needs to raise funds externally, ceteris paribus. Existing theoretical and empirical 
voluntary disclosure research suggests that firm profitability is associated with a firm’s 
motivation for disclosure, such as conveying good news and having better access to external 
financing. For a firm’s incentive to convey good news, a vast majority of voluntary disclosure 
theories suggest that firms are more likely to choose disclosure to reduce adverse selection costs 
due to information asymmetry as their private information becomes more favorable (e.g., 
Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1986; Darrough and Stoughton 1990). Empirical studies show mixed 
results. While some studies document a positive association between firm profitability and 
                                                 
2
 In this study, I focus on the association between bank characteristics and banks’ external financing incentive, and 
the effect of that association on early-adoption decisions. Therefore, the multiple-standard-setting enables a 
powerful test and generalizability of the results. A drawback of this setting is that I am unable to “customize” an 
early-adoption decision model for each accounting standard and I leave this issue for future research. 
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management earnings forecasts (e.g., Lev and Penman 1990; Lang and Lundholm 1993, 2000), 
other studies argue and document that firms choose to disclose preemptive bad news in earnings-
related disclosures when facing potential litigation costs or management reputation costs (e.g., 
Skinner 1994; Cao and Narayanamoorthy 2011). For a firm’s incentive to better access external 
financing, recent disclosure studies have suggested a negative association between firm 
profitability and voluntary disclosure (e.g., Francis, Khurana, and Pereira 2005; Suijs 2007). 
These studies argue that high profit firms have few concerns about acquiring funds in capital 
markets because they are financially healthy. They can either generate funds through internal 
growth or raise funds externally with low cost of capital without additional disclosure. On the 
other hand, low profit firms have limited ability to generate funds internally and thus are 
relatively reliant on external financing. High profit firms, therefore, are not as motivated as low 
profit firms to choose disclosure to gain better access to external financing. Taken together, the 
above discussion suggests that bank profitability is an important determinant of the likelihood of 
early adoption. It is, however, an empirical issue whether a bank’s incentive to better access 
external financing dominates other reasons in their early-adoption decisions.  
Besides profitability, voluntary disclosure studies also investigate the association between 
firm risk and a firm’s incentive to better access external financing. Empirical studies suggest that 
non-financial firms can better access external financing through voluntary disclosure by lowering 
the cost of capital (e.g., Botosan 1997; Sengupta 1998; Botosan and Plumlee 2002). Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) argue that if firm performance variability proxies for information asymmetry 
between investors and managers, riskier firms are more likely to choose disclosure to reduce 
adverse selection costs due to information asymmetry. Consequently, risky firms can better 
access external financing with lower cost of capital through voluntary disclosure than without 
such disclosure. Suijs (2007) theoretically suggests that the likelihood of disclosure increases 
with the uncertainty in firms’ future performance (i.e. firm risk profiles). The above discussion 
suggests that the likelihood of early adoption is positively associated with bank risk profiles. 
I use logit regressions to test the association of early-adoption decisions with bank 
profitability and bank risk profiles by examining the early-adoption decisions of 486 U.S. BHCs 
for 16 accounting standards. I find a negative relationship between the likelihood of early 
adoption and bank profitability. In addition, I find a positive relationship between the likelihood 
of early adoption and bank risk profiles. Standardizing the coefficients on explanatory variables, 
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I find that a one-standard-deviation decrease in bank profitability increases the odds ratio (early 
adoption to late adoption) by 47%. A one-standard-deviation increase in interest rate risk on the 
investment portfolios, credit risk on the loan portfolios, the notional amount of derivative 
exposures, and the operational risk increases the odds ratio by 19%, 23%, 13%, and 14%, 
respectively. Further analysis shows that the predictions are best supported in the contexts of 
early-adoption decisions on accounting standards with ex ante undetermined income effects and 
with only disclosure requirements. Moreover, banks are more likely to choose to adopt early 
accounting standards related to financial instruments or with low standard complexity for the 
purpose of better accessing capital markets.     
In summary, the above findings indirectly support the assertion that early-adoption 
decisions are based on gaining better access to external financing. To provide ex post evidence 
on a bank’s incentive to better raise funds in capital markets, I examine whether early bank 
adopters generally experience higher growth of funds than their matched late bank adopters 
between the standard issue date and its effective date (i.e., the testing period) after controlling for 
bank profitability. It is also worth noting that a bank’s financing strategies may change with 
macroeconomic conditions. For instance, during economic expansions, the market demand for 
loans increases and therefore banks’ demand for funds also increases. On the other hand, the 
market demand for loans decreases during economic contractions and therefore banks are less 
motivated to expand sources of funds. Consequently, I expect early adopters to experience higher 
growth of funds than matched late adopters during economic expansions. The results show that 
early adopters generally experience a higher growth of funds than matched late adopters in 
testing periods that take place during economic expansions. Further analysis shows that the 
major source of funds contributing to the growth is short-term liabilities other than deposits.      
This paper extends and complements prior early-adoption studies in several ways. First, 
this paper introduces incentives to better access external financing as a new reason to early adopt. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to utilize a large set of early-adoption data of 
BHCs and systematically examine BHCs’ early-adoption decisions. Early adoption of accounting 
standards is rare for banks, with the rate of early adoption ranging from zero to 19%. Despite this 
rarity, the ex post evidence in this study on early-adopters’ immediate improvement in accessing 
capital markets reinforces the idea that banks’ incentive to better access external financing is 
important in explaining their early-adoption decisions. Second, by analyzing adoption of 
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multiple standards, this study provides evidence of variations in early-adoption decisions given 
different income effects of accounting standards, standard types (financial versus non-financial), 
and standard complexity. Finally, the evidence of negatively associated bank profitability and 
positively associated bank risk profiles with early-adoption decisions suggests a counter-
signaling effect (e.g., Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To 2002) of early-adoption decisions. The 
signaling theory suggests that high quality firms undertake costly actions to signal their superior 
quality and separate themselves from low quality firms (e.g., Spence 1973, 2002; Morris 1987). 
Therefore, qualified signals distinguish two types of firms: low or high quality firms. When 
additional noisy information on firms’ quality is available, the counter-signaling theory suggests 
that high quality firms choose not to signal their quality or counter-signal to separate themselves 
from medium quality firms. Medium quality firms, on the other hand, choose to signal to 
separate themselves from low quality firms. Therefore, in a counter-signaling equilibrium, three 
types of firms are identified: low, medium, or high quality firms. Prior accounting research on 
accounting choice has applied the signaling theory to explain managers’ decisions but the results 
do not always concur with the theory (e.g., Eakin and Gramlich 2000; Aboody, Barth, Kasznik 
2004). This study is the first to identify counter-signaling effects of early-adoption decisions 
because it documents that early-adopting banks are not necessarily the less risky and the most 
profitable. As banks are closely scrutinized by bank regulators, maintaining growth in 
profitability and practicing sound risk management are of utmost importance to banks’ 
operations. Hence, implications about a bank’s future financial performance may be gathered by 
analyzing its early-adoption decisions over time. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews related early 
adoption literature and develops the hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes the empirical predictions 
and research design, and presents findings. Chapter 4 proceeds with additional analyses. Chapter 
5 summarizes and concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RELATED PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Related Prior Literature 
Extant work on the selection of time for which mandatory accounting standards are 
adopted (i.e., early adoption or adoption timing) focuses on issues such as motivations for early 
adoption (e.g., Ayres 1986; Scott 1991; Langer and Lev 1993; Ali and Kumar 1994; Amir and 
Livnat 1996; Gujarathi and Hoskin 2003), and economic consequences or stock market reactions 
to early adoption (e.g., Lee and Stiner 1993; Beatty 1995; Amir and Ziv 1997a, b). The first 
application of the positive theory of accounting (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) to management’s 
choice of adoption date of an accounting standard appears in Ayres (1986). That study examines 
the existence of systematic differences between early and late adopters of the new foreign 
currency translation accounting standard, SFAS No. 52 (FASB 1981), and finds results 
consistent with the debt and compensation contracting, and political costs hypotheses.   
Scott (1991), Langer and Lev (1993), and Ali and Kumar (1994) examine managerial 
motives for choosing the adoption timing of the new standard on pension accounting, SFAS No. 
87 (FASB 1985). Scott (1991) examines and documents the influence of political costs, 
management compensation contracts, and the magnitude of the income effect of the adoption on 
the adoption-timing choice. In the context of examining FASB’s justification for an extended 
adoption period, Langer and Lev (1993) show that a motive to increase reported earnings 
consistently distinguishes early versus late adopters. Ali and Kumar (1994) complement the 
literature by studying interactions between firm characteristics and the magnitude of the income 
effect of the adoption in explaining the adoption-timing choice. They find that including 
interactions enhances the explanatory power of the adoption-timing choice model.  
Gujarathi and Hoskin (2003) investigate factors that affect economic incentives to early 
adopt the new accounting standard on income taxes, SFAS No. 96 (FASB 1987). Their results 
are consistent with the political cost hypothesis and the debt and compensation contract 
hypotheses in explaining early adoption decisions and the choice of the transition method. 
Similar to Ali and Kumar (1994), they also document higher explanatory power of the early 
adoption model with interactions between the income effect of the adoption and other testing 
variables. 
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Amir and Livnat (1996) study a manager’s motives to early adopt the new accounting 
standard on postretirement benefits other than pensions, SFAS No. 106 (FASB 1990). By 
comparing early and late adopters, they show that firms early adopt the standard to correct the 
market’s perception of the magnitude of the postretirement benefit obligation (PRB) as lower. In 
addition, they show that firms early adopt the standard in the quarter with the lowest earnings 
and delay adoption to negotiate a plan amendment. Amir and Ziv (1997b) develop a theoretical 
model that shows how firms use adoption timing and recognition/disclosure choices to convey 
their private information to the market (assuming managers have private information about the 
valuation effects of a standard). In their companion paper, Amir and Ziv (1997a) empirically 
document the predictions from Amir and Ziv (1997b) in the context of early adopting SFAS No. 
106. Specifically, they find that, on average, early adopters experience more extreme changes in 
earnings during the adoption year (compensation contract hypothesis), carry smaller PRB at the 
mandatory adoption date, and are less likely to renegotiate their contracts. In addition, they find 
that early adopters generally experience positive market reactions to their adoption 
announcements and perform better than late adopters during the five years prior to the mandatory 
adoption date. 
Beatty (1995) is the only study that examines the determinants of the early-adoption 
decisions by the banking industry. She finds that BHCs choose early adoption of SFAS No. 115 
(FASB 1993) to increase regulatory equity. The standard requires available-for-sale securities to 
be fair-valued, with the changes in fair values to be charged to an equity account as unrealized 
gains or losses. Most banks have net unrealized gains in their investment portfolios when the 
standard is issued. Therefore, early adopting the standard provides an opportunity for banks to 
increase their regulatory capital because net unrealized gains could be included in the calculation 
of regulatory capital. 3  She finds that early-adopting BHCs are characterized as having low 
leverage ratio and high ROE, and managing their securities portfolios in the past to increase 
reported equity. In addition, she examines the changes in investment behavior between early and 
late adopters of SFAS No. 115. According to her findings, early adopters reduce the proportion 
of investment securities to assets and the maturity of the investment securities held due to the 
                                                 
3
 The effect of the standard on Tier 1 capital, however, was excluded by the Federal Reserve Board three quarters 
after the standard became mandatorily effective in November 1994 (Beatty 1995). 
8 
 
attempts to reduce regulatory capital costs as potential volatility in recognized fair values and in 
the regulatory capital ratios increases.  
As shown above, most studies on why managers choose to early adopt accounting 
standards are based on a contractual framework. Generally, the studies find that a manager’s 
motives for early adoption are consistent with the debt and compensation contract hypotheses 
and the political cost hypothesis. However, there are few empirical investigations into the 
informational effect on early-adoption decisions. In addition, the literature is short of evidence 
on the banking industry.  
This paper complements the current early-adoption literature by examining BHCs’ 
incentive to early adopt accounting standards to disclose information and thus better access 
external financing. I consider banks’ incentives to early adopt accounting standards from an 
information disclosure perspective for the following reason. In some sense, banks are no 
different from other firms in terms of their goals to maximize firm values. Banks enjoy the 
economies of scale in the acquisition/production of information about borrowers and have 
expertise in taking deposits and making loans to individuals and businesses (Berger, Herring, and 
Szego 1995). Banks are subject, however, to bank regulatory supervisions. They need to 
maintain adequate capital and show the bank regulators their capability of effectively managing 
bank balance sheets and related risks.4 Under regulations, banks have every incentive to stay 
well-capitalized for economic benefits such as less regulatory scrutiny and more operational 
flexibility. In addition, it is often costly to raise equity capital quickly if the banks are not well 
capitalized (Beatty et al. 1996; Furlong and Kwan 2007). The above discussion clarifies that 
maintaining capital and managing risk are essential to banks. To this end, banks have the 
incentives to disclose information for the purpose of better accessing capital markets. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 The supervisory rating system for bank holding companies is known as BOPEC (Bank subsidiaries, Other nonbank 
subsidiaries, Parent company, Earnings, and Capital adequacy) (Hirtle and Lopez 1999). Although the Federal 
Reserve emphasized risk management in its supervisory processes, this component was not directly reflected in the 
name of BOPEC. Therefore, in December 2004, the Federal Reserve revised the rating system as RFI/C(D) (Risk 
Management (R); Financial Condition (F); potential Impact (I) of the parent company and nondepository 
subsidiaries (collectively nondepository entities) on the subsidiary depository institution(s); Composite rating (C) 
based on an evaluation and rating of its managerial and financial condition and an assessment of future potential risk 
to its subsidiary depository institution(s); Depository Institution (D)). The revised rating system became effective on 
January 1, 2005 (Federal Reserve Board 2004). 
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2.2 Incentive to Better Access External Financing 
Extant disclosure theories and empirical research suggest that firms are motivated to 
disclose information voluntarily to better access external financing (e.g., Leland and Pyle 1977; 
Myers and Majluf 1984; Ruland, Tung, and George 1990; Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson 1995; 
Lang and Lundholm 2000; Francis, Khurana, and Pereira 2005; Suijs 2007). Empirical studies 
also show that firms experience lower costs of debt and equity capital with more disclosure (e.g., 
Botosan 1997; Sengupta 1998; Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Francis, Khurana, and Pereira 2005). 
Because banks need to raise funds in capital markets, they are motivated to have better access to 
external financing with voluntary disclosure.  
Banks may vary in their capability or needs of raising funds externally. Therefore, the net 
expected benefits/costs of voluntary disclosure for the purpose of having better access to external 
financing differ according to bank characteristics. Prior voluntary disclosure research suggests 
that firm profitability is associated with a firm’s disclosure decisions. Specifically, firm 
profitability may proxy for a firm’s incentive to convey favorable information and to better 
access external financing. For firms’ incentive to convey favorable information, prevalent 
disclosure theories and empirical studies suggest that firms are more likely to choose disclosure 
to reduce information asymmetry as their private information becomes more favorable (e.g., 
Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1986; Darrough and Stoughton 1990; Lev and Penman 1990; Lang and 
Lundholm 1993, 2000). A general explanation for the theoretical prediction and empirical 
findings is non-zero disclosure costs. On the other hand, some empirical studies argue and 
document that firms choose to disclose preemptive bad news to minimize potential litigation 
liability or management reputation costs (e.g., Skinner 1994; Cao and Narayanamoorthy 2011).  
For a firm’s incentive to better access external financing, prior studies suggest that firm 
profitability is negatively associated with a firm’s incentive to better access external financing 
and thus negatively with voluntary disclosure. Francis, Khurana, and Pereira (2005) argue that 
the cost of external financing is particularly important for firms with limited internal cash flows; 
those firms are motivated to make voluntary disclosures to lower the cost of capital. Intuitively, 
firms can either generate cash flows internally or acquire capital externally to fund their 
operations or investments. Low profit firms, however, have limited ability to generate cash flows 
internally, and thus making the cost of external financing particularly important to them. 
Therefore, low profit firms are relatively motivated to choose disclosure compared to high profit 
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firms to lower the cost of external financing. Suijs (2007) models how a firm varies its voluntary 
disclosure policy to acquire more capital from an investor when the firm is uncertain how the 
investor will respond to the disclosure. The model suggests a partial disclosure equilibrium 
where a firm hides high profit and discloses low profit. The intuition is that a high profit firm can 
easily raise funds in capital markets without disclosure compared to a low profit firm. As a result, 
low profit firms are more motivated than high profit firms to choose voluntary disclosure.  
In summary, the preceding discussion suggests an association between voluntary 
disclosure and firm profitability. Albeit the results conflict from extant empirical studies on the 
association between firm disclosure and firm profitability, they still support the idea that 
voluntary disclosures arise when the expected benefits exceed costs. Consequently, whether 
banks’ incentive to better access external financing dominates in their early-adoption decisions 
remains an empirical issue. I hypothesize bank profitability in an alternative form as follows: 
H1: The likelihood of early adoption is negatively related to bank profitability.  
Voluntary disclosure research also motivates the association between firm risk and a 
firm’s incentive to better access external financing. In an empirical study, Lang and Lundholm 
(1993) argue if firm performance variability (i.e., firm risk) proxies for information asymmetry 
between investors and managers, firms with high performance variability are more likely to 
choose disclosure to relieve information asymmetry. Moreover, studies find that firms can 
improve external financing with voluntary disclosure by lowering costs of debt and equity capital 
(e.g., Botosan 1997; Sengupta 1998; Botosan and Plumlee 2002). The discussion therefore 
implies a positive association between firm risk profiles and voluntary disclosure. In addition, 
Suijs (2007) theoretically suggests that the likelihood of disclosure increases with the uncertainty 
in firms’ future performance (i.e. firm risk profiles). The intuition is that when uncertainty in 
firms’ future performance increases, less risky investment targets such as a risk-free asset 
become more and more attractive to investors in the absence of disclosure. Consequently, riskier 
firms, which experience relatively high profits compared to the return of the risk-free asset, are 
more likely to choose disclosure to attract investors’ capital away from the risk-free asset.5 
Because early adoption is a form of voluntary disclosure, banks with higher risk profiles are 
                                                 
5
 In a similar note, Jung and Kwon (1988, p. 151) suggest that the disclosure threshold is lower (i.e., more likely to 
disclose) when uncertainty in firm value is higher under the assumption that the market is unsure whether managers 
indeed possess information.  
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more likely to choose early adoption to better access external financing. I hypothesize bank risk 
profiles in an alternative form as follows: 
H2: The likelihood of early adoption is positively related to bank risk profiles. 
 The above leads to an intriguing issue questioning whether a bank that chooses early 
adoption can better access external financing ex post than if it does not choose early adoption. 
Consequently, I hypothesize better access to external financing in an alternative form as follows: 
H3: A bank that chooses early adoption can better access external financing than if 
it does not choose early adoption.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LIKELIHOOD OF EARLY ADOPTING ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
 
3.1 Empirical Predictions 
In the previous section, I illustrate a bank manager’s motive for early adoption to provide 
information and to obtain better access to capital markets. Now, I describe the test variables used 
to study these incremental benefits/costs to early adoption. I explain other control variables 
which are commonly used in prior literature. Finally, I discuss the variables used to control for 
accounting standard characteristics which represent incremental costs and benefits to 
management when they decide to early adopt an accounting standard. 
3.1.1 Test Variables 
The first set of test variables relate to bank profitability. The proxy for bank profitability 
is NIM, the ratio of net interest income to total assets adjusted for the average NIM of peer banks 
at the first quarter-end after the adoption of a new standard.6 I expect a negative relationship 
between early adoption and NIM, as discussed in section 2.2. To examine whether banks’ 
incentive to disclose preemptive bad news drives the negative relationship instead of their 
incentive to better access external financing, I include an indicator variable BADNEWS. 
BADNEWS is equal to 1 if NIM is less than zero and 0 otherwise. I predict a negative relationship 
between early adoption and BADNEWS if the concern for potential litigation liability and 
management reputation costs is not an issue in banks’ early-adoption decisions. I also examine 
whether high-profit banks are more likely to choose early adoption when they are more certain of 
receiving a positive response to the disclosure as suggested by Suijs (2007). That is, to examine 
whether the negative relationship between early adoption and NIM is moderated as the level of 
response certainty increases, I include a proxy for response certainty and interact it with NIM. 
Response certainty, RPCERTAINTY, is measured by the percentage of times that a bank’s net 
interest margin is greater than the average net interest margin of peer banks during the past 
                                                 
6
 A primary objective in asset-liability management for banks is managing net interest margin (NIM). It measures 
how well banks minimize interest paying to liabilities (e.g., deposits and long-term debts) while maximizing 
interests receiving from assets (e.g., loans) to produce consistent growth in the loan portfolio and shareholder 
earnings (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 1999). I adjust the net interest margin for the average net interest margin of 
peer banks to remove the effect of the macroeconomic conditions specific to the time period. This adjusted measure 
also proxies for the information not yet expected by the market. A drawback of this measure is that the time-series 
property of the profitability measure of a bank is not controlled for. I also use ROA instead of NIM, and the results 
are qualitatively the same. 
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twelve quarters before the announcement date of an accounting standard.7 A higher level of 
response certainty means that a bank is more certain of receiving a positive response following 
the disclosure of its performance. Therefore, conditional on knowing its performance, a bank is 
more likely to disclose its profitability when it is more certain of receiving a positive response 
following the disclosure. Consequently, I predict a positive relationship between early adoption 
and RPCERTAINTY as well as NIM_RPCERTAINTY (an interaction term between NIM and 
RPCERTAINTY).  
The second set of predictions relates to bank risk profiles (i.e., interest rate risk, credit 
risk, exposures and credit risk on derivatives, and operational risk on noninterest income). I 
predict that banks with higher risk profiles are more likely to early adopt an accounting standard. 
I evaluate bank risk profiles in four dimensions: (1) interest rate risk, (2) credit risk, (3) 
exposures and credit risk on derivatives, and (4) operational risk. All risk proxies are adjusted for 
the corresponding average risk proxies of peer banks except for indicator variables. This 
adjustment controls the effect of macroeconomic conditions on banks’ risk management or risk-
taking behavior. The following paragraphs provide detailed discussions on the proxies chosen. 
The two proxies for interest rate risk are AFSOFINV, the ratio of available-for-sale 
securities (excluding equity securities) to total investment securities, and CONTRACT, an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank holds interest rate derivative contracts and 0 otherwise. 
Banks with higher proportion of available-for-sale securities out of total investment securities 
have greater financial flexibility in managing interest rate risk and thus have lower interest rate 
risk (e.g., Beatty 1995; Hodder, Kohlbeck, and McAnally 2002; Papiernik, Meier, and Rozen 
2004). Therefore, this paper expects a negative relationship between early adoption and 
AFSOFINV. Banks can hold derivative contracts to manage interest rate risk or to speculate (e.g., 
Chen, Liu, and Ryan 2008). Thus, I do not predict the sign of CONTRACT.  
The proxy for credit risk on loan portfolios is LOANRISK, the ratio of the allowance for 
loan losses to average loans. It measures the amount of buffer the bank management creates for 
the whole loan portfolios in case of future write-offs (e.g., Joyce 1996). Banks with a higher ratio 
of loan loss allowance to average loans are associated with lower credit risk and higher loan 
                                                 
7
 The results are similar regardless of the length of period the response certainty is measured (ranging from 4 
quarters to 20 quarters). The average profitability of peer banks is chosen as a benchmark because it is a legitimate 
proxy for the investors’ prior expectations of a bank’s profitability. Although analysts’ EPS forecasts can be another 
benchmark used to construct response certainty, doing so would reduce more than half of the sample observations. 
Therefore, I choose to use the average net interest margin of peer banks as a benchmark. 
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quality (Eccher, Ramesh, and Thiagarajan 1996, p. 103). Therefore, I expect a negative 
relationship between early adoption and LOANRISK. 
The proxy for exposures of derivatives is EXPOSUREDER, the ratio of the gross notional 
amount of derivative contracts other than purchased options to total assets. Derivative contracts 
such as futures, forward contracts, written options, and swaps have no particular limits on the 
exposures. The financial exposures of purchased options, however, are limited to their book 
values accounted for in the financial statements (Nissim and Penman 2007).  The proxy for credit 
risk of derivatives is CREDITRISKDER, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the gross notional 
amount of over-the-counter (OTC) derivative contracts is greater than that of exchange-traded 
derivative contracts and 0 otherwise. Exchange-traded derivative contracts such as futures and 
exchange-traded options have trivial credit risk because the exchanges act as the counterparty to 
each contract (Nissim and Penman 2007). As a result, banks with greater proportion of OTC 
derivative contracts relative to exchange-traded derivative contracts are positively associated 
with credit risk on derivative contracts. Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between early 
adoption and EXPOSUREDER/CREDITRISKDER. 
The proxy for operational risk is NONINTCHG, the average quarterly growth in 
noninterest income over the past six quarters. Noninterest income has become an increasingly 
important source of revenues in the banking industry. However, noninterest income growth is 
much more volatile than the net interest income growth, largely due to volatile trading revenues. 
In addition, it is shown that the higher the share of income derived from noninterest activities, 
the lower the risk-adjusted returns and the higher the insolvency risk (e.g., Stiroh 2004). 
Therefore, banks with a higher share of income derived from noninterest activities are positively 
associated with higher operational risk. I expect a positive relationship between early adoption 
and NONINTCHG. 
3.1.2 Control Variables 
I control for several variables used in prior early adoption literature. In particular, I 
control for bank size, SIZE, the logarithm of total interest and noninterest income. The effect of 
size is most commonly attributed to political visibility (e.g., Ayres 1986; Moyer 1990; Scott 
1991; Ali and Kumar 1994). However, differences in accounting choices between large and 
small firms could be due to other reasons (e.g., Trombley 1989). For example, size can also 
proxy for compliance costs (e.g., Ball and Foster 1982; Sami and Welsh 1992; Langer and Lev 
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1993). In the context of government regulations, Ball and Foster (1982) suggest that the 
compliance costs could decrease in firm size. Sami and Welsh (1992) suggest that large firms are 
more likely to have the necessary resources to adopt an accounting standard early if information 
production costs associated with adoption are high. Prior studies also document that size is 
positively associated with firms’ litigation risk which in turn influences firms’ disclosure 
decisions (e.g., Cao and Narayanamoorthy 2011). Therefore, I do not predict a sign on the 
relationship between early adoption and SIZE.  
I use LEVERAGE, the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, as a proxy for banks’ 
propensity to access capital markets (e.g., Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik 2004). The easier it is for 
banks to access capital markets, the lower the benefits associated with early adoption of an 
accounting standard. On the other hand, Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2011) show that leverage 
ratio is positively associated with firms’ litigation risk and that the likelihood of voluntary 
disclosure increases in litigation risk. Thus, I do not predict a sign on the relationship between 
early adoption and LEVERAGE.8  
I use DROE as a proxy for bank management’s incentives to delay early adoption of 
income-increasing accounting standards to maximize current and future compensation (e.g., Ali 
and Kumar 1994; Gujarathi and Hoskin 2003). DROE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a 
BHC’s return on equity (ROE) falls in the highest or lowest quartiles of the ROE distribution for 
the sample BHCs and 0 otherwise. NIEFF is coded as 1 if the income effect of adoption is 
expected to be positive, -1 if negative, and 0 if the direction of the income effect is undetermined 
or if there is no income effect of adoption (e.g., Ali and Kumar 1994; Gujarathi and Hoskin 
2003). I expect a positive relationship between early adoption and NIEFF. To test the conditional 
effect of DROE on the likelihood of early adoption, an interaction term is created, DROE_NIEFF, 
between DROE and NIEFF. Managers of banks with extreme ROE are less likely to early adopt 
an income-increasing accounting standard, as it is less likely to make a difference in the 
calculation of bonus compensation (e.g., Gujarathi and Hoskin 2003). Therefore, I expect a 
negative relationship between early adoption and DROE_NIEFF and do not predict the sign of 
the relationship between the likelihood of early adoption and DROE. 
                                                 
8
 The debt ratio may also proxy for the tightness of existing debt covenants (Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik 2004). 
However, it is not feasible to test the debt covenant hypothesis without a discussion on the income effect of the 
adoption and thus the effect on debt contracting costs. Therefore, I do not predict the sign of the relationship 
between early adoption and leverage if leverage is viewed as a proxy for the tightness of existing debt covenants. 
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 While early-adoption decisions on various accounting standards seem independent from 
each other, some consistency in the adoption policy of each bank over time may exist. Therefore, 
a bank that chose early adoption of previously issued accounting standards will likely continue to 
choose early adoption of a new accounting standard. To control for the consistency in the 
adoption policy, I construct a variable, CULTURE, which measures the percentage of times that 
a bank chose to early adopt accounting standards issued in prior periods. I predict that a bank is 
more likely to early adopt a new accounting standard when CULTURE is higher.9 
Market competition may be another important consideration factor. First, market 
competition may explain the negative relationship between bank profitability and early adoption. 
Specifically, banks which operate in highly concentrated markets (i.e., with monopoly power) 
tend to have high profitability. On the other hand, banks that operate in competitive markets tend 
to have lower profitability than those that operate with monopoly power. This information 
suggests a positive relationship between profitability and market concentration; therefore, there 
is possibly a correlated omitted variable problem. To relieve the problem, I include a measure of 
market concentration (MKTHERF) in the early-adoption decision model. MKTHERF is 
calculated as the sum of squared market shares in terms of total revenues (i.e., total net interest 
income and noninterest income) of all BHCs in population operating in the same geographic 
region.10 Second, market concentration itself may also contribute to early-adoption decisions. In 
particular, voluntary disclosure literature suggests that proprietary costs may keep firms from 
making disclosure (e.g., Verrecchia 1983; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). One commonly 
used measure of proprietary costs is the level of market concentration. Several empirical studies 
in the voluntary disclosure literature suggest a positive relationship between the level of 
proprietary costs associated with information disclosure and the level of market concentration 
(e.g., Scott 1994; Botosan and Harris 2000; Sengupta 2004). However, the results on this 
relationship are often mixed. Given the above discussion, I do not predict a sign on MKTHERF. 
                                                 
9
 I also construct another variable which considers a bank’s historical adoption pattern regarding similar types of 
accounting standards. However, including this variable in the early-adoption decision model reduces the total 
sample observations by half and the coefficient on this variable is not statistically significant.  
10
 Following Moyer (1990), I consider five geographic regions: Eastern, Southeast, Midwest, Southwest, and West. I 
construct another market concentration measure based on 13 Federal Reserve Districts: Boston, New York, 
Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Kansas City, Dallas, San Francisco, 
and Washington, D.C. The last way to classify markets is that I assume large BHCs (total assets greater than $10 
billion) operate at a national level whereas small (total assets less than $1 billion) or mid-sized BHCs (total assets 
between $1 billion and $10 billion) operate in local or regional markets. The results are qualitatively the same. 
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3.1.3 Accounting Standard Characteristics 
The FASB issued 16 accounting standards from January 1995 to March 2008 that 
allowed reporting entities to early adopt those pronouncements. All of these standards are fair-
value related. Topics of these standards relate to leases, servicing assets and liabilities, stock 
compensation, retirement benefits, derivatives and hedging, intangibles, asset retirement, exit or 
disposal cost obligations, fair value measurements and disclosures, and financial instruments. 
The diversity in standard characteristics given in this set of sample accounting standards enables 
me to examine features representing costs and benefits that discourage or encourage early 
adoption across standards. Inclusion of these costs and benefits in the analyses yields a more 
complete picture of banks’ early adoption behavior. Out of 16 accounting standards, five are 
expected to have definitive income-decreasing effects, two with definitive income-increasing 
effects, five with ex ante undetermined income effects, and four with no income effects (i.e. only 
disclosure requirements). Three standards prompt changes in the calculation of regulatory capital. 
An overview of the sample accounting standards examined in this paper is provided in Appendix 
I. 
I control for three dimensions of standard characteristics: (1) disclosure requirements, (2) 
impact on the calculation of regulatory capital, and (3) implementation costs. Disclosure 
requirements speak to whether an accounting standard requires only footnote disclosure or 
recognition in financial statements proper. Prior studies have shown that financial statement 
users place less weight on disclosures in footnotes than those in financial statements because 
footnote disclosures are only subject to a standard audit (e.g., Titman and Trueman 1986; Amir 
and Ziv 1997a, b). Consequently, firms benefit less from early adopting a disclosure-only 
accounting standard than from early adopting an accounting standard that requires recognition. 
The proxy used is DISCLOSURE, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the accounting standard only 
requires disclosures and 0 otherwise. I expect a negative relationship between early adoption and 
DISCLOSURE. 
New accounting standards may lead to changes in the calculation of regulatory core 
capital under bank regulators’ discretion.11 Banks have every incentive to stay well-capitalized. 
                                                 
11
 Since the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, banks have been required to 
adopt generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) (Furlong and Kwan 2007). In addition, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) requires that regulatory accounting standards be at least 
as strict as GAAP (Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo 1996; Ramesh and Revsine 2001). In situations where 
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For example, banks that are classified as well-capitalized are subject to less regulatory scrutiny, 
obtain more operational flexibility, and face fewer restrictions on financial activities in which 
they could engage. They also enjoy expedient treatment in certain transactions where regulatory 
approval is needed such as mergers and acquisitions. In addition, it is often costly to raise equity 
capital quickly if banks are not well capitalized. A bank is expected to hold a buffer of capital to 
limit the chances of falling below the well-capitalized cutoff (Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo 
1996; Furlong and Kwan 2007, p. 10). Hence, I expect that banks are more (less) likely to early 
adopt accounting standards that lead to positive (undetermined) changes in the calculation of 
regulatory capital under bank regulators’ discretion for the benefit of adjusting their capital to an 
optimal level. The proxy used is REG_POS (REG_UN), an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
pronouncement of an accounting standard could lead to positive (undetermined) changes in the 
calculation of regulatory capital and 0 otherwise. I expect a positive relationship between early 
adoption and REG_POS as bank management can utilize the changes in the calculation of 
regulatory capital to adjust their capital to an optimal level. I expect a negative relationship 
between early adoption and REG_UN as the benefit of adjusting banks’ capital to an optimal 
level is less clear to bank management. 
Implementation costs speak to the continuing move by the FASB toward a principles-
based approach. The FASB intends to smoothly converge to the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and to reduce complexity in accounting standards and firm costs of 
applying new accounting standards (Choi and McCarthy 2003; Schipper 2003).12 Therefore, I 
predict that it is more costly for banks to early adopt a more complex standard than a less 
complex one. I use PAGE, the number of pages of a sample accounting standard as issued to 
proxy for standard complexity. I expect a negative relation between early adoption and PAGE 
because it is more costly to early adopt an accounting standard with greater complexity. 
3.2 Research Design and Descriptive Statistics 
To test the predictions discussed in the previous subsection, I estimate the following logit 
model using maximum likelihood estimation: 
                                                                                                                                                             
concerns about the calculation of regulatory capital exist with the implementation of new accounting 
pronouncements, bank regulators develop interim capital rules as they see fit in a timely fashion and publish them in 
Federal Register. 
12
 A principles-based accounting framework is subject to some criticisms, however. One is that the framework 
allows more professional judgment made by managers and auditors. Hence, it is essential to “strengthen 
enforcement while reduce the incidence of litigation over accounting treatments” (Schipper 2003). 
19 
 
EARLYij = ∑ β0N
9
N=1 YEARNi + β1NIMij + β2RPCERTAINTYij + β3NIM_RPCERTAINTYij  
+ β4BADNEWSij + β5AFSOFINVij + β6CONTRACTij + β7LOANRISKij  
+ β8EXPOSUREDERij + β9CREDITRISKDERij + β10NONINTCHGij  
+ β11SIZEij + β12LEVERAGEij + β13DROEij + β14NIEFFj + β15DROE_NIEFFij  
+ β16MKTHERFij + β17CULTUREij + β18DISCLOSUREj + β19REG_POSj  
+ β20REG_UNj + β21PAGEj + εij.                                                                      (1) 
The dependent variable, EARLYij, is equal to 1 if BHC i early adopted the accounting standard j 
and 0 otherwise. YEARN is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the accounting standard was issued 
in year N and 0 otherwise. I include year fixed effects to control for the effects of 
macroeconomic conditions surrounding the pronouncements of accounting standards. All other 
variables are discussed in the previous subsection and defined in Appendix II. 
 In order to examine whether income effects of accounting standards affect banks’ early-
adoption decisions for the purpose of having better access to external financing, I estimate the 
following logit model separately for accounting standards with (1) income-decreasing effects, (2) 
income-increasing effects, (3) ex ante undetermined income effects, and (4) only disclosure 
requirements: 
EARLYij = β0 + β1NIMij + β2RPCERTAINTYij + β3NIM_RPCERTAINTYij  
+ β4BADNEWSij + β5AFSOFINVij + β6CONTRACTij + β7LOANRISKij  
+ β8EXPOSUREDERij + β9CREDITRISKDERij + β10NONINTCHGij  
+ β11SIZEij + β12LEVERAGEij + β13DROEij + β14MKTHERFij + β15CULTUREij  
+ εij.                                                                                                             (2) 
Table 1 describes the procedures used in reaching the final sample. The total number of 
BHCs listed in the Bank Regulatory data base during 1995-2008 is 9,293. To hand collect the 
adoption status of each sample accounting standard disclosed in 10Q/10K filings for each BHC, 
all 10Qs/10Ks filed by banks between 1994 and 2008 were researched using the Morningstar 
Document Research data base.13 A total of 581 BHCs filed 10Qs/10Ks during the period. The 
                                                 
13
 The 10Qs and 10Ks are only available in electronic files starting on January 1, 1994. Therefore, the earliest 
accounting standard allowing for early adoption that I could attend to with a complete adoption period (i.e., a period 
starting from a standard announcement date to a standard effective date) is SFAS No. 121, “Accounting for the 
impairment of long-lived assets and for long-lived assets to be disposed of”, which was issued in March 1995 and 
effective on and after December 15, 1995. The sample period ends in March 2008 because SFAS No. 161, 
“Disclosures about derivative instruments and hedging activities—an amendment of SFAS No. 133”, was the most 
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total available number of BHC-standard observations is 5,218, which is less than expected (i.e., 
581 BHCs × 16 accounting standards = 9,296 BHC-standard observations) due to two reasons. 
First, not every BHC provides a discussion on the adoption status of each sample accounting 
standard in its filings. Second, some BHCs only file 10Q/Ks up to some point in time during the 
sample period. As a final step, observations without the required information from the Bank 
Regulatory data base are eliminated to calculate all independent variables at the bank level. This 
action yields a final sample of 3,822 BHC-standard observations (486 unique BHCs). 
Table 2 presents the sample distribution by bank size (small, mid-sized, and large) and 
early adoption status of each sample accounting standard. Small BHCs is the biggest group of the 
total sample (52.2%), followed by mid-sized BHCs (36.9%) and large BHCs (10.9%). On 
average, 3.3% of small BHCs, 3.8% of mid-sized BHCs, and 10.8% of large BHCs choose to 
early adopt sample accounting standards. Differences in early adoption rates exist between peers 
and between standards. For example, no large BHCs early adopted SFAS No. 133 (FASB 1998) 
while 20% of small BHCs and 15% of mid-sized BHCs chose to early adopt the standard. SFAS 
No. 123R (FASB 2004) presents another extreme case, as only 0.8% of small BHCs chose early 
adoption. As to SFAS No. 157 (FASB 2006), 16.7% of large BHCs chose to early adopt the 
standard, while approximately 5% of small and mid-sized BHCs chose early adoption. Finally, 
the results reveal that no BHCs chose to early adopt the following four accounting standards: 
SFAS No. 123 (FASB 1995), SFAS No. 132 (FASB 1998), SFAS No. 144 (FASB 2001), and 
SFAS No. 132R (FASB 2003). There is a lack of cross-sectional variation in early adoption of 
other standards as well. To consider the effects on the inferences, I keep BHC-standard 
observations related to five accounting standards with the most early-adoption cases and estimate 
the early-adoption decision model. A brief discussion is provided in section 4. 
Table 3, panel A presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses. In 
general, approximately 4.3% of BHC-standard observations choose early adoption. NIM 
distributes with no skew and a mean close to zero (i.e., -0.03%). RPCERTAINTY ranges from 0 
to 1 and distributes with a mean of 0.405 (median = 0.391). This data shows that, on average, the 
sample banks are not highly certain of receiving a positive response following the disclosure of 
their performance (e.g., 10Q/K filings). Approximately 59% of total sample observations are 
                                                                                                                                                             
recent accounting standard allowing for early adoption at the time when I researched 10Qs and 10Ks for banks’ 
early-adoption decisions. 
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experiencing low performance relative to peer banks. The statistics of AFSOFINV show that 
approximately 75% of the BHC-standard observations hold more of the total investment 
portfolios in available-for-sale securities than their peer banks. Approximately 37% of the BHC-
standard observations are involved with interest rate related derivative contracts. The mean of the 
adjusted ratio of loan loss allowance to average loans, LOANRISK, is approximately -0.2%. 
EXPOSUREDER ranges from -.029 to 44.520, which shows diverse bank derivative activities 
even after adjusted for the derivative activities of peer banks. The results show that 38% of the 
banks hold more OTC than exchange-traded derivative contracts. SIZE distributes with positive 
skew and dispersion, ranging from 7.867 to 18.880. The mean of LEVERAGE is 0.908, which is 
expected for the banking industry. More than half of the observations are within one standard 
deviation around the mean of LEVERAGE. The mean of DROE is approximately 0.5 by 
construction. Finally, MKTHERF ranges from 0.023 to 0.363, which suggests widely-varied 
market competition in which banks operate (from unconcentrated to high concentration). 
Table 3, panel B compares the variables used in the analyses between early and late bank 
adopters by using t-tests and Wilcoxon tests for differences in means and medians. Most 
differences are significant and consistent with predictions. For example, consistent with 
predictions, NIM is significantly smaller for early bank adopters than for late bank adopters for 
both mean and median at the 1% level. In addition, AFSOFINV is significantly smaller while 
EXPOSUREDER and CREDITRISKDER are significantly greater for early adopters than for late 
adopters. 
3.3 Primary Findings Related to Likelihood of Early Adopting Accounting Standards 
Table 4 shows the results from estimating equation (1). Model (1) and model (2) are 
subsets of equation (1) because including NONINTCHG and CULTURE in the model would lead 
to a total loss of 459 observations in estimation. Model (3) is the full model as specified in 
equation (1). In general, the results are consistent with the predictions. Because the results for 
model (1), model (2), and model (3) are similar, the following discusses the results based on 
model (3) more in depth. 
Relating to H1, NIM is significantly and negatively related to the likelihood of early 
adoption (p-value = .008). This result indicates that more profitable banks with fewer concerns 
about attracting funds from capital providers are less likely to early adopt an accounting standard. 
To examine whether the level of response certainty moderates this negative relationship, I 
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include RPCERTAINTY and NIM_RPCERTAINTY. NIM_RPCERTAINTY is significant (p-value 
= .022), while RPCERTAINTY is insignificant. The standardized coefficient on NIM shows that a 
one standard-deviation increase in NIM while holding RPCERTAINTY at zero decreases the odds 
ratio (early adoption to late adoption) by 46.6%. BADNEWS is significant with predicted sign in 
every model. This data implies that a bank’s incentive to disclose preemptive bad news in early 
adoption does not drive the negative relationship between early adoption and bank profitability. 
In general, H1 is supported by the results.  
Relating to H2, all measures for bank risk profiles except CREDITRISKDER are 
significant with predicted signs. In particular, AFSOFINV and LOANRISK are significantly and 
negatively associated with the likelihood of early adoption (p-value = .008 and .031, 
respectively). This data indicates that banks with lower interest rate risk on investment portfolios 
and credit risk on loan portfolios are less likely to early adopt an accounting standard. Also as 
predicted, the coefficients on EXPOSUREDER and NONINTCHG are significantly and 
positively associated with the likelihood of early adoption (p-value = .005 and .000, respectively). 
This finding denotes that banks with greater derivative exposure and higher operational risk are 
more likely to choose early adoption. The coefficient on CONTRACT is different from zero (p-
value = .023), which indicates that holding interest-rate-related derivative contracts is also 
associated with the likelihood of early adoption. The standardized coefficients on AFSOFINV 
and LOANRISK suggest that a one standard-deviation increase in each variable decreases the 
odds ratio by 19.1% and 23.3%, respectively. On the other hand, a one standard-deviation 
increase in EXPOSUREDER and NONINTCHG increases the odds ratio by 12.7% and 13.9%, 
respectively. Therefore, H2 is supported by the results. 
Relating to accounting standard characteristics that encourage/discourage early adoption, 
as predicted, a positive impact on the calculation of regulatory capital, REG_POS, and an 
undetermined impact on the calculation of regulatory capital, REG_UN, are significant with 
predicted signs (p-value = .000 and .010, respectively). Therefore, banks are more likely to early 
adopt a standard that provides an opportunity for them to increase regulatory capital to an 
optimal level than a standard that does not, but less likely to early adopt a standard that can 
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impact banks’ capital either upwardly or downwardly. Lastly, no support is found for 
DISCLOSURE and PAGE (p-value = .126 and .151, respectively).14  
Relating to the control variables, SIZE is significantly different from zero in model (1) 
and model (2) (p-value = .027 and .062, respectively). It does lose significance when the model 
includes CULTURE in model (3). LEVERAGE is not significant in any cases. Similar to SIZE, 
DROE_NIEFF is significantly and negatively related to the likelihood of early adoption in model 
(1) and model (2) (p-value = .027 and .029, respectively). This finding signifies that managers of 
banks with ROE in the extreme quartiles are less likely to early adopt an income-increasing 
standard because the adoption is unlikely to make a difference in the bonus compensation 
calculation. However, DROE_NIEFF is no longer significant in model (3) where CULTURE is 
included. Both DROE and NIEFF are not significantly different from zero in any models. The 
insignificant results may suggest that these commonly used variables have less power in 
explaining banks’ early-adoption decisions than other industrial firms’ early-adoption decisions. 
Lastly, market concentration (MKTHERF) is not statistically significant in any cases, but a 
bank’s past early-adoption policy (CULTURE) is significantly and positively associated with 
early adoption (p-value = .006). 
Table 5 shows the results from estimating equation (2) given different income effects of 
accounting standards. Relating to bank profitability, the likelihood of early adoption is 
significantly and negatively related to NIM under three scenarios: when the income effects of 
accounting standards are increasing or ex ante undetermined, and when accounting standards 
only require disclosure (p-value = .049, .004 and .001, respectively). The negative relationship is 
moderated by RPCERTAINTY in the latter two cases (p-value = .008 and .000, respectively).15 
The main effect of RPCERTAINTY is insignificant under the scenario of ex ante undetermined 
income effects but significantly negative under the scenario of only disclosure requirements. 
NIM is not significant in explaining early-adoption decisions on accounting standards with 
                                                 
14
 DISCLOSURE is significant with the opposite predicted sign in model (1) and model (2). One possible 
explanation is that accounting standards with only disclosure requirements may incur low contracting costs and 
regulatory costs relative to standards with income effects. Therefore, banks are more willing to choose to early adopt 
an accounting standard with only disclosure requirements than with income effects for the purpose of having better 
access to external financing. Although PAGE is insignificant in model (3), it is significant with predicted sign in 
model (1) and model (2).  
15
 Note that the negative relationship between early adoption and bank profitability is not moderated by 
RPCERTAINTY when I only consider accounting standards with income-increasing effects. Therefore, the 
documented negative relationship is also consistent with the political costs hypothesis that highly profitable firms 
tend not to early adopt an accounting standard with income-increasing effects.    
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income-decreasing effects. The main effect of RPCERTAINTY is significant with predicted sign 
(p-value = .046), whereas NIM_RPCERTAINTY is insignificant. BADNEWS is significant with 
predicted sign under every scenario except the scenario of accounting standards with income-
decreasing effects. The results suggest that banks are less likely to choose early adoption when 
they experience relatively bad performance. However, in the context of income-increasing 
accounting standards, the negative relationship is also consistent with the argument that banks 
with relatively bad performance are less likely to early adopt income-increasing accounting 
standards so to minimize their potential litigation costs. 
Relating to bank risk profiles, AFSOFINV is only significant with predicted sign when 
used to explain early-adoption decisions on accounting standards with ex ante undetermined 
income effects. LOANRISK is significant with predicted sign in two scenarios: accounting 
standards with income-decreasing effects and with only disclosure requirements. 
EXPOSUREDER is significant with predicted sign when used to explain accounting standards 
with undetermined income effects, but is significant with the opposite predicted sign when used 
to explain accounting standards with income-increasing effects. CREDITRISKDER is not 
significant in any cases. NONINTCHG is only significant with predicted sign when used to 
explain early-adoption decisions with only disclosure requirements. In contrast, it is significant 
with the opposite predicted sign when used to explain early-adoption decisions on accounting 
standards with income-decreasing effects and with ex ante undetermined income effects.  
Relating to the control variables, SIZE is significantly related to the likelihood of early 
adoption when used to explain accounting standards with income-decreasing and income-
increasing effects (p-value = .010 and .026). In particular, the findings that the likelihood of early 
adoption is positively associated with SIZE in the context of income-increasing accounting 
standards are not uncommon. For example, Scott (1991), Sami and Welsh (1992), and Ali and 
Kumar (1994) all find a positive relationship between early adoption and firm size for an 
income-increasing standard (i.e., SFAS No. 87, pension accounting). LEVERAGE is significantly 
related to early-adoption decisions on accounting standards with income-decreasing effects or 
with ex ante undetermined income effects (p-value = .022 and .021, respectively). DROE is 
significantly and negatively related to early-adoption decisions on accounting standards with 
income-increasing effects. MKTHERF is only statistically significant when used to explain early-
adoption decisions on accounting standards with income-increasing effects and with only 
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disclosure requirements. Finally, banks’ past early-adoption policy (CULTURE) is significantly 
and positively associated with early adoption in various scenarios except accounting standards 
with income-decreasing effects. 
Taken together, the results show that banks are more likely to choose early adoption of 
accounting standards with ex ante undetermined income effects and with only disclosure 
requirements for the purpose of better accessing external financing. 
3.4 Comparisons of the Financing Activities between Early and Late Adopters 
The previous subsection provides evidence on bank profitability and bank risk profiles in 
explaining early-adoption decisions. As bank profitability and risk profiles characterize banks’ 
motivation for information disclosure and thus better access to external financing, it merits 
examining whether early bank adopters do ex post experience higher growth of funds. In this 
subsection, I examine my third hypothesis during the period between the issued date and the 
effective date of an accounting standard (i.e., the testing period). 
Both H1 and the results suggest that banks with high profitability are less likely to 
voluntarily disclose information because they have few concerns about raising funds. 
Consequently, it is likely that late bank adopters with high profitability experience comparable 
financing activity growth without early adoption to those of early bank adopters. To address this 
issue, I match each early adopter to a late adopter with comparable profitability based on the net 
interest margin measured at the most recent quarter-end before standard announcement dates. In 
addition, banks’ financing strategies may change with the macroeconomic conditions in general. 
For instance, loan demands increase during economic expansions and hence banks’ demand for 
funds also increases. On the other hand, loan demands decrease during economic contractions 
and hence banks’ demand for fund also decreases. I therefore expect early adopters to experience 
higher growth of funds than matched late adopters during the testing periods that are in economic 
expansions. 
Figure 1 compares early adopters and matched late adopters in the growth of funds 
attributed to changes in deposits, changes in liabilities other than deposits, and changes in 
preferred and common stock and related surplus during the testing periods. 16  For better 
illustration, I separately show the growth of funds of banks during the testing periods that take 
                                                 
16
 Liabilities other than deposits include federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase, 
trading liabilities, other borrowed money, subordinated notes and debentures, and other liabilities. 
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place in economic expansions and economic contractions. Panel (a) displays the growth of funds 
during the testing periods in economic expansions, while panel (b) exhibits growth during the 
testing periods in economic contractions. Panel (a) shows that, in general, regardless of the 
income effects of accounting standards, early bank adopters experience higher growth of funds 
than their matched counterparts. On the other hand, panel (b) does not show any particular trend 
in the growth of funds between early adopters and matched late adopters as expected. In terms of 
economic significance, the differences in the growth of funds (scaled by total assets) between 
early adopters and matched late adopters range from -0.8% to 4.9% during the testing periods 
that are in economic expansions. The difference is only statistically significant when comparing 
early adopters and their matched counterparts altogether during all testing periods in economic 
expansions (one-tailed p-value = .080).   
Further analysis suggests that the growth of liabilities other than deposits mainly accounts 
for the total growth of funds of early adopters during testing periods that take place in economic 
expansions observed in figure 1. In terms of economic significance, the differences in the growth 
of liabilities other than deposits (scaled by total assets) between early adopters and matched late 
adopters range from 0.7% to 3.9%. In terms of statistical significance, the differences are 
significant in the cases of early adoption of SFAS No. 122, SFAS No. 133, SFAS No. 156, and 
SFAS No. 157 (one-tailed p-values = .050, .054, .071, and .019, respectively). As for equity 
capital (i.e., changes in preferred and common stock and related surplus), there does not seem to 
be a particular trend in the growth of capital between early adopters and matched late adopters 
during the testing periods in either economic expansions or economic contractions. The 
differences between early adopters and their matched counterparts are not statistically significant 
in any case of early adoption. This result suggests that in general, raising equity capital is costly 
for banks and therefore does not serve as the main driver of the total growth of banks’ funds. In 
summary, early-adopting banks appear to experience higher growth of funds than matched late-
adopting banks during the testing periods that take place in economic expansions. Hence, H3 is 
supported by the results. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
 
This chapter presents two additional analyses to evaluate the robustness of the findings. 
The first set of analysis considers the effects of differences in the banking operations between 
small, mid-sized, and large banks on early-adoption decisions. In the second set of analysis, I 
investigate the issue of insufficient cross-sectional variations in adoption cases as identified in 
subsection 3.2.  
To analyze the first set, I estimate the early-adoption decision model separately for small, 
mid-sized, and large BHCs. I conduct this analysis because the banking operations can differ 
between various bank sizes. Although the testing variables are adjusted for the average measures 
of peer banks, the remaining variations in the testing variables can still be attributable to 
differences in banking operations between small, mid-sized, and large BHCs. Table 6 panel A 
presents the results. In general, the predictions are still supported for small and mid-sized BHCs. 
The major exception of the results is shown for the large BHC group; specifically, the 
relationship between bank profitability and early adoption becomes positive but only marginally 
significant (p-value = .087). One plausible explanation is that the information environment of 
large banks is likely to be transparent. As a result, banks’ uncertainty about how investors will 
respond to the disclosure is not a major concern. Therefore, large and highly profitable banks are 
more likely to early adopt accounting standards.  
Also worth noting, large banks are more likely to choose to early adopt accounting 
standards with relatively high standard complexity. To examine how banks’ early-adoption 
decisions vary with standard complexity, I classify 16 accounting standards into three levels of 
complexity based on the number of pages of a standard: low, medium, and high complexity.17 
Instead of using PAGE, I use two dummy variables denoting low and high standard complexity 
in the early-adoption decision model. The results in table 6 panel B suggest that large banks are 
more likely to early adopt standards with relatively high complexity. On the other hand, small 
banks are more (less) likely to early adopt standards with relatively low (high) complexity. 
                                                 
17
 Accounting standards with low complexity include SFAS No. 122, SFAS No. 132, SFAS No. 146, SFAS No. 155, 
and SFAS No. 161. Accounting standards with medium complexity include SFAS No. 121, SFAS No. 142, SFAS 
No. 143, SFAS No. 144, SFAS No. 132R, and SFAS No. 159. Accounting standards with high complexity include 
SFAS No. 123, SFAS No. 133, SFAS No. 123R, SFAS No. 156, and SFAS No. 157. 
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Standard complexity, however, does not seem to affect mid-sized banks’ early-adoption 
decisions. One plausible explanation for the results is that large banks are more likely than small 
banks to engage in highly-complex transactions. They are also more likely than small banks to be 
subject to bank regulators’ encouragement to choose to early adopt standards which improve 
disclosures related to complex transactions. In addition, large banks are able to dedicate more 
resources than small banks to implement new and complex standards. Consequently, large banks 
are more likely to early adopt accounting standards with higher standard complexity. Evidence 
that small banks are more (less) likely to choose to early adopt accounting standards with low 
(high) complexity than with medium complexity is also consistent with the argument that small 
banks engage in transactions with low complexity. Therefore, for the purpose of information 
disclosure, it is conceivable that small banks tend to early adopt standards with low complexity 
than with high complexity.   
As mentioned in section 3.2, many of the accounting standards examined in this paper do 
not have sufficient cross-sectional variations in the number of early-adoption cases. To examine 
the potential effect on the inferences of the results, I keep BHC-standard observations related to 
SFAS No. 122, SFAS No. 133, SFAS No. 156, SFAS No. 157, and SFAS No. 159 in the 
estimation. These five standards are chosen because they contain the most early-adoption cases. I 
estimate the early-adoption decision model in a pooled regression for all five accounting 
standards. In general, the untabulated results are similar to those presented in table 4. In 
particular, the negative relationship between NIM and the likelihood of early adoption still holds. 
The negative relationship is moderated by the level of response certainty, RPCERTAINTY, 
similar to the results documented in table 4. In addition, the results support the prediction that 
banks with greater risk profiles are more likely to early adopt accounting standards. The results 
using ROA instead of NIM as a bank profitability measure are qualitatively the same.18  
It is important to note that firms that choose to early adopt SFAS No. 159 also needs to 
early adopt SFAS No. 157. In the sample observations, 21 banks that chose to early adopt SFAS 
No. 157 also early adopted SFAS No. 159 and vice versa (i.e., a total of 21 BHCs). Therefore, it 
is possible that early adoption of SFAS No. 157 reflects the needs for banks to early adopt SFAS 
                                                 
18
 I also estimate the early-adoption decision model separately for (1) accounting standards related to financial 
instruments (i.e., SFAS No. 122, SFAS No. 133, SFAS No. 155, SFAS No. 156, SFAS No. 157, SFAS No. 159, and 
SFAS No. 161) and (2) all other accounting standards examined in this study. The results suggest that a bank’s 
incentive to better access external financing predominantly explains a bank’s early-adoption decisions on accounting 
standards related to financial instruments but not on all other accounting standards.  
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No. 159. I estimate the early-adoption model in a pooled regression by using only SFAS No. 122, 
SFAS No. 133, and SFAS No. 156. The results are qualitatively the same.19 
In summary, these additional analyses concur with the inferences made in the previous 
section. Specifically, bank profitability and bank risk profiles are significantly associated with 
the likelihood of early adoption. In various cases, the documented negative relationship between 
bank profitability and early adoption is moderated by the level of response certainty. In addition, 
standard complexity is of importance in small and large banks’ early-adoption decisions. Future 
research could consider incentives or factors specific to each accounting standard. 
                                                 
19
 All untabulated results are available upon request. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
I investigate whether U.S. bank holding companies choose to early adopt accounting 
standards to provide new information and better access capital markets. In particular, I examine 
whether the likelihood of early adoption is negatively associated with bank profitability and 
positively associated with bank risk profiles. The set of the accounting standards employed in 
this study were issued from January 1995 to March 2008.  
I find that the likelihood of early adoption is significantly and negatively related to bank 
profitability, which is proxied by the net interest margin. Furthermore, I discover that the 
likelihood of early adoption is significantly and positively related to bank risk profiles, which are 
proxied by the interest rate risk on the investment portfolios, the credit risk on the loan portfolios, 
derivative exposures, and the operational risk. Conditional on the income effects of accounting 
standards, the predictions are best supported when using bank profitability and risk profiles to 
explain early-adoption decision on accounting standards with ex ante undetermined income 
effects and with only disclosure requirements. Finally, the results indicate that early adopters 
experience higher growth of funds than matched late adopters during the periods between the 
issued dates and the effective dates of accounting standards, particularly in economic expansions. 
This finding reinforces the idea that banks voluntarily disclose information for the purpose of 
having better access to external financing in the context of early adoption. 
This study appeals to both academic and practical audiences. From an academic 
perspective, my paper complements the existing early-adoption literature by providing an 
additional motivation for early adoption. This motivation power is at its greatest when used to 
explain early-adoption decisions on accounting standards with ex ante undetermined effects and 
with only disclosure requirements. This study complements the line of research in managers’ 
voluntary disclosure decisions for capital market reasons in the context of banks’ early-adoption 
decisions (Healy and Palepu 2001, p.420). My research may also interest financial statement 
preparers and users. The results in this study suggest that implications about a firm’s future 
performance may be gathered by analyzing a firm’s early-adoption decisions over time. With the 
counter-signaling role in the early-adoption decisions, firms may think twice when evaluating 
early adoption of accounting standards. In a follow-up paper, I examine whether a bank’s early-
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adoption behavior have implications on future bank performance. Future research may examine 
conditions under which early-adoption behavior better implies firms’ future performances or it 
may consider whether the motive for early adoption to provide new information and thus better 
access capital markets applies in other industries. 
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APPENDIX A: ACCOUNTING STANDARDS FROM JANUARY 1995 TO MARCH 2008 
Accounting Standards 
Issued Date 
(or the earliest 
adoption date) 
Effective Date 
(for fiscal years 
after the date) 
Potential 
income effects 
of the 
adoption 
Disclosures 
only? 
Changes in 
calculation of 
regulatory core 
capital? 
Number 
of pages 
No. 121 
Accounting for the Impairment of 
Long-Lived Assets and for Long-
Lived Assets to Be Disposed Of  
March 1995 December 15, 1995 −   47 
No. 122 
Accounting for Mortgage Servicing 
Rights--an amendment of FASB 
Statement No. 65  
May 1995 December 15, 1995 +    35 
No. 123 
Accounting for Stock-Based 
Compensation 
October 1995 December 15, 1995 −   89 
No. 132 
Employers' Disclosures about 
Pensions and Other Postretirement 
Benefits--an amendment of FASB 
Statements No. 87, 88, and 106  
February 1998 December 15, 1998 ?    29 
No. 133 
Accounting for Derivative 
Instruments and Hedging Activities 
June 1998 June 15, 2000 ?    176 
No. 142 
Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets 
March 15, 
2001 
December 15, 
2001 ?   75 
No. 143 
Accounting for Asset Retirement 
Obligations 
June 2001 June 15, 2002 −   49 
No. 144 
Accounting for the Impairment or 
Disposal of Long-Lived Assets 
August 2001 December 15, 2001 −   65 
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APPENDIX A (cont.) 
Accounting Standards 
Issued Date (or 
the earliest 
adoption date) 
Effective Date 
(for fiscal years 
after the date) 
Potential 
income effects 
of the 
adoption 
Disclosures 
only? 
Changes in 
calculation of 
regulatory core 
capital? 
Number 
of pages 
No. 146 
Accounting for Costs Associated 
with Exit or Disposal Activities 
June 2002 December 31, 2002 +   25 
No. 132R 
Employers' Disclosures about 
Pensions and Other Postretirement 
Benefits--an amendment of FASB 
Statements No. 87, 88, and 106 
December 2003 December 15, 2003 ?    40 
No. 123R 
Share-Based Payment December 2004 June 15, 2005 −   171 
No. 155 
Accounting for Certain Hybrid 
Financial Instruments--an 
amendment of FASB Statements No. 
133 and 140 
February 2006 September 15, 2006 ?    18 
No. 156 
Accounting for Servicing of 
Financial Assets--an amendment of 
FASB Statement No. 140 
March 2006 September 15, 2006 ?   114 
No. 157 
Fair Value Measurements September 2006 
November 15, 
2007 ?    86 
No. 159 
The Fair Value Option for Financial 
Assets and Financial Liabilities--
Including an amendment of FASB 
Statement No. 115 
February 2007 November 15, 2007 ?   36 
No. 161 
Disclosures about Derivative 
Instruments and Hedging Activities--
an amendment of FASB Statement 
No. 133 
March 2008 November 15, 2008 ?    32 
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APPENDIX B: LOGIT MODEL FOR EARLY ADOPTION DECISIONS 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
Dependent variable 
EARLY An indicator variable that equals 1 if BHCs early adopted accounting standards 
and 0 otherwise. Early adoption information is obtained from 10Q/Ks. BHCs 
may not discuss all accounting standards examined in this paper in their 10Q/Ks. 
Therefore, only BHC-standard observations with available discussion on the 
pertinent accounting standards are included in the initial sample.  
  
Test variables 
Hypothesis 1—Profitability: 
NIM NIM is measured by the net interest income (BHCK4074) divided by total assets 
(BHCK2170) (net interest margin) at the first quarter-end after the adoption of a 
new accounting standard and adjusted for the average net interest margin of peer 
banks. 
RPCERTAINTY The percentage of times that a bank’s net interest margin is greater than the 
average net interest margin of peer banks during the past 12 quarters before the 
announcement date of an accounting standard. 
NIM_RPCERTAINTY An interaction term between NIM and RPCERTAINTY. 
BADNEWS An indicator variable equal to 1 if NIM is less than zero and 0 otherwise. 
 
Hypothesis 2—Risk profiles: 
(a) Interest rate risk  
AFSOFINV The proportion of available-for-sale securities (excluding equity securities) out of 
total investment securities, adjusted for the average AFSOFINV of peer banks. 
Total investment securities are the sum of available-for-sale securities 
(BHCK1773) and held-to-maturity securities (BHCK1754). 
CONTRACT An indicator variable equal to 1 if a BHC holds interest rate derivative contracts 
and 0 otherwise. 
(b) Credit risk  
LOANRISK The ratio of the allowance for loan and lease losses at the quarter-end 
(BHCK3123) to average quarterly loans and leases (BHCK3516), adjusted for 
the average LOANRISK of peer banks. 
(c) Exposures and credit risk of derivatives 
EXPOSUREDER The level of exposure to derivative contracts (EXPOSUREDER) is measured by 
the ratio of the gross notional amount of derivative contracts other than purchased 
options (i.e. futures contracts, forward contracts, written options, and swaps) to 
total assets (BHCK2170), adjusted for the average EXPOSUREDER of peer 
banks. 
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APPENDIX B (cont.) 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
CREDITRISKDER An indicator variable that equals 1 if the gross notional amount of over-the-
counter derivative contracts (i.e. forwards, over-the-counter options, and swaps) 
is greater than that of exchange-traded derivative contracts (i.e. futures contracts 
and exchange-traded options) and 0 otherwise. 
  
(d) Operational risk  
NONINTCHG Average quarterly growth in noninterest income (BHCK4079) over the past six 
quarters, adjusted for the average NONINTCHG of peer banks during the same 
period. 
Control variables 
SIZE The logarithm of total revenues. Total revenues are defined as the sum of total 
interest income (BHCK4107) and total noninterest income (BHCK4079). 
LEVERAGE Total liabilities (BHCK2948) divided by total assets (BHCK2170). 
DROE DROE is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a BHC’s ROE falls in the highest 
or lowest quartiles of the ROE distribution for the sample BHCs during a 
benchmark quarter and 0 otherwise. ROE is calculated as income (loss) before 
income taxes and extraordinary items, and other adjustments (BHCK4301) 
divided by the last quarter-end total equity capital (BHCK3210).  
NIEFF The variable is coded as 1 if adoption of a sample accounting standard is 
expected to have a positive effect on income, -1 if a negative effect on income is 
expected, and 0 if either a positive, a negative or no direct effect on income is 
possible. 
DROE_NIEFF An interaction term between DROE and NIEFF. 
MKTHERF MKTHERF is measured by the sum of the squared market shares (based on total 
interest income and total noninterest income) of banks operating in the same 
geographic region; five geographic regions are identified: Eastern, Southeast, 
Midwest, Southwest, and West. 
CULTURE CULTURE is measured by the percentage of times that a bank chose early 
adoption before making the current early-adoption decision on a new accounting 
standard. 
DISCLOSURE An indicator variable that equals 1 if an accounting standard only requires 
disclosures and 0 otherwise. 
REG_POS An indicator variable that equals 1 if the pronouncement of an accounting 
standard could lead to changes in the rule of Tier 1 capital calculation and a 
positive effect on Tier 1 capital; 0 otherwise. 
REG_UN An indicator variable that equals 1 if the pronouncement of an accounting 
standard could lead to changes in the rule of Tier 1 capital calculation and an 
undetermined effect on Tier 1 capital; 0 otherwise. 
PAGE The number of pages of a sample accounting standard as issued. 
Note: All variables are measured at the latest quarter-end or for the latest quarter (the benchmark quarter) before 
standard announcement dates, unless otherwise mentioned. For example, all variables are measured for the fourth 
quarter in 2005 or at the end of the fourth quarter in 2005 for FAS 156, which was announced in March 2006. 
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Table 1. Description of the Eliminations Made in Reaching the Final Sample 
  
Number of BHCs BHC-Standard Observations 
Initial sample of BHCs 
Number of BHCs listed in the Bank Regulatory database  
between 1995 and 2008 9,293 
Remove: 
Number of BHCs with the parent company not in the banking  
industry (SIC: 6020) and without available 10Q/Ks (8,734) 
Sample of BHC-Standard observations 
Sample of BHCs with 10Q/Ks describing the adoption status of  
examined accounting standards between 1995 and 2008 581 5,218 
Remove: 
Observations that do not have all the necessary data from the 
Bank Regulatory database (1,396) 
Final sample used in the early adoption model 486     3,822 
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Table 2. Early Adoption by Standard and Bank Size  
Standard Peer 1 Peer 2 Peer 3 -------- Total -------- 
0 1 Total 0 1 Total 0 1 Total 0 1 Total 
121 59 59 27 2 29 10 1 11 96 3 99 
122 81 6 87 26 10 36 5 11 16 112 27 139 
123 90 90 41 41 15 15 146 0 146 
132 69 69 37 37 12 12 118 0 118 
133 132 33 165 57 10 67 20 20 209 43 252 
142 198 198 100 1 101 26 26 324 1 325 
143 99 4 103 42 42 17 17 158 4 162 
144 154 154 81 81 23 23 258 0 258 
146 126 126 72 1 73 24 1 25 222 2 224 
132R 56 56 45 45 16 16 117 0 117 
123R 253 2 255 138 138 33 33 424 2 426 
155 105 1 106 104 104 29 5 34 238 6 244 
156 122 5 127 118 6 124 23 12 35 263 23 286 
157 146 7 153 157 8 165 35 7 42 338 22 360 
159 137 6 143 164 10 174 39 6 45 340 22 362 
161 105 1 106 147 5 152 44 2 46 296 8 304 
Total 1,932 65 1,997 1,356 53 1,409 371 45 416 3,659 163 3,822 
# of Different BHCs 385 55 385 221 40 221 49 20 50 485 109 486 
Note: Peer 1 includes BHCs with total assets less than $1 billion. Peer 2 includes BHCs with total assets between $1 and $10 billion. Peer 3 includes BHCs with 
total assets greater than $10 billion. 0 denotes late adopters and 1 denotes early adopters. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Sample Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. Min P25 P50 P75 Max N 
EARLY 0.043 0.202 0 0 0 0 1 3,822 
NIM -0.0003 0.003 -0.018 -0.001 -0.0004 0.001 0.027 3,822 
RPCERTAINTY 0.405 0.342 0 0.044 0.391 0.696 1 3,822 
BADNEWS 0.590 0.492 0 0 1 1 1 3,822 
AFSOFINV 0.033 0.227 -0.844 -0.044 0.120 0.165 0.544 3,822 
CONTRACT 0.374 0.484 0 0 0 1 1 3,822 
LOANRISK -0.002 0.005 -0.014 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.098 3,822 
EXPOSUREDER 0.194 2.008 -0.029 -0.025 -0.021 -0.011 44.520 3,822 
CREDITRISKDER 0.383 0.486 0 0 0 1 1 3,822 
SIZE 11.080 1.701 7.867 9.971 10.800 11.890 18.880 3,822 
LEVERAGE 0.908 0.024 0.238 0.899 0.911 0.922 0.980 3,822 
DROE 0.498 0.500 0 0 0 1 1 3,822 
MKTHERF 0.136 0.087 0.023 0.047 0.129 0.217 0.363 3,822 
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Table 3 (cont.) 
Panel B. Early vs. Late Adopters 
  Early Adopters Late Adopters     
T-Test Wilcoxon Test 
Variable n Mean Median n Mean Median p-value p-value 
NIM 163 -0.001 -0.0008 3,659 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.001 0.004 
RPCERTAINTY 163 0.364 0.261 3,659 0.407 0.391 0.115 0.113 
BADNEWS 163 0.601 1 3,659 0.589 1 0.761 0.761 
AFSOFINV 163 -0.012 0.068 3,659 0.035 0.122 0.011 0.000 
CONTRACT 163 0.552 1 3,659 0.366 0 0.000 0.000 
LOANRISK 163 -0.002 -0.003 3,659 -0.002 -0.002 0.390 0.150 
EXPOSUREDER 163 1.558 -0.019 3,659 0.133 -0.021 0.000 0.000 
CREDITRISKDER 163 0.589 1 3,659 0.374 0 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 163 11.780 10.940 3,659 11.050 10.790 0.000 0.050 
LEVERAGE 163 0.908 0.912 3,659 0.908 0.911 0.890 0.773 
DROE 163 0.436 0 3,659 0.501 1 0.103 0.103 
MKTHERF 163 0.128 0.088 3,659 0.137 0.129 0.228 0.102 
Note: The p-values for differences in means and medians between early and late adopters are based on two-tailed tests. EARLY is an indicator variable that equals 
1 if BHCs early adopted accounting standards and 0 otherwise. NIM is measured by the net interest income (BHCK4074) scaled by total assets (BHCK2170) at 
the first quarter-end after the adoption of a new accounting standard and adjusted for the average net interest margin of peer banks. RPCERTAINTY is the 
percentage of times that a bank’s net interest margin is greater than the average net interest margin of peer banks during the past 12 quarters before the standard 
announcement dates. BADNEWS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if NIM is less than zero and 0 otherwise. AFSOFINV is the proportion of available-for-sale 
securities out of total investment securities and is computed as BHCK1773÷(BHCK1773+BHCK1754), adjusted for the average AFSOFINV of peer banks. 
CONTRACT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a BHC holds interest rate derivative contracts and 0 otherwise. LOANRISK is the ratio of the allowance for loan 
and lease losses at the quarter-end (BHCK3123) to average quarterly loans and leases (BHCK3516), adjusted for the average LOANRISK of peer banks. 
EXPOSUREDER is measured by the ratio of the gross notional amount of derivative contracts other than purchased options (i.e. futures contracts, forward 
contracts, written options, and swaps) to total assets, adjusted for the average EXPOSUREDER of peer banks. CREDITRISKDER is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the gross notional amount of over-the-counter derivative contracts is greater than that of exchange-traded derivative contracts and 0 otherwise. SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of the sum of total interest income (BHCK4107) and total noninterest income (BHCK4079). LEVERAGE is total liabilities (BHCK2948) 
divided by total assets (BHCK2170). DROE is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a BHC’s ROE falls in the highest or lowest quartiles of the ROE distribution 
for the sample BHCs during a benchmark quarter and 0 otherwise. MKTHERF is measured by the sum of the squared market shares (based on total interest 
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income and total noninterest income) of banks operating in the same geographic region; five geographic regions are identified: Eastern, Southeast, Midwest, 
Southwest, and West. 
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Table 4. Early-Adoption Decision Model—All Standards 
 
Independent Expected Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Variable Sign Coeff. %StdX z-stat. p-value Coeff. %StdX z-stat. p-value Coeff. %StdX z-stat. p-value 
Hypothesis 1: 
NIM − -283.77 -50.90 -3.38 0.001 -295.95 -52.50 -3.36 0.001 -248.26 -46.60 -2.43 0.008 
RPCERTAINTY + -0.09 -3.00 -0.27 0.394 -0.05 -1.60 -0.14 0.446 -0.29 -9.40 -0.74 0.231 
NIM_RPCERTAINTY + 288.00 52.40 2.30 0.011 291.10 54.00 2.18 0.015 272.00 51.30 2.02 0.022 
BADNEWS − -0.70 -29.20 -2.57 0.005 -0.68 -28.50 -2.34 0.010 -0.67 -28.10 -2.10 0.018 
Hypothesis 2: 
AFSOFINV − -0.87 -17.90 -2.42 0.008 -0.90 -18.20 -2.37 0.009 -0.97 -19.10 -2.41 0.008 
CONTRACT ? 0.47 25.50 2.02 0.043 0.43 23.10 1.82 0.069 0.59 33.50 2.27 0.023 
LOANRISK − -53.75 -22.50 -2.01 0.023 -62.57 -25.50 -2.33 0.010 -58.34 -23.30 -1.87 0.031 
EXPOSUREDER + 0.06 12.60 2.95 0.002 0.06 13.70 2.99 0.002 0.06 12.70 2.63 0.005 
CREDITRISKDER + 0.39 20.70 1.46 0.073 0.47 25.60 1.73 0.042 0.16 8.30 0.58 0.281 
NONINTCHG + 0.29 13.30 5.21 0.000 0.29 13.90 5.24 0.000 
Control Variables: 
SIZE ? 0.19 38.60 2.21 0.027 0.17 33.90 1.87 0.062 0.14 27.40 1.46 0.144 
LEVERAGE ? -5.09 -11.70 -1.33 0.183 -5.21 -11.70 -1.21 0.227 -5.79 -12.90 -1.50 0.135 
DROE ? -0.01 -0.30 -0.03 0.979 -0.03 -1.60 -0.16 0.870 -0.01 -0.60 -0.06 0.951 
NIEFF + -0.34 -18.20 -0.39 0.350 -0.39 -20.40 -0.44 0.332 0.02 1.30 0.03 0.490 
DROE_NIEFF − -0.80 -28.60 -1.93 0.027 -0.80 -28.50 -1.91 0.029 -0.55 -20.10 -1.06 0.146 
MKTHERF ? 1.15 10.50 0.77 0.439 1.52 14.20 0.96 0.339 2.56 25.00 1.56 0.118 
CULTURE + 1.81 28.60 2.53 0.006 
DISCLOSURE − 0.67 32.80 1.73 0.042 0.70 35.10 1.76 0.040 0.46 22.10 1.15 0.126 
REG_POS + 4.84 147.60 3.66 0.000 4.89 150.60 3.63 0.000 4.62 98.70 4.00 0.000 
REG_UN − -2.83 -61.40 -3.24 0.001 -2.90 -61.80 -3.21 0.001 -2.21 -52.20 -2.33 0.010 
PAGE − -0.01 -53.70 -1.83 0.034 -0.02 -56.20 -1.91 0.028 -0.01 -37.90 -1.04 0.151 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4 (cont.) 
Independent Expected Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Variable Sign Coeff. %StdX z-stat. p-value Coeff. %StdX z-stat. p-value Coeff. %StdX z-stat. p-value 
N 3,822 3,628 3,363 
# of clusters 486 462 454 
Pseudo R2   0.25       0.25       0.24       
Note: The p-values are based on one-tailed tests when the prediction is directional, and on two-tailed tests otherwise. The table reports the results of estimating 
the following model using logit regression with standard errors clustered at the bank level. 
EARLYij = ∑ β0N
9
N=1 YEARNi + β1NIMij + β2RPCERTAINTYij + β3NIM_RPCERTAINTYij + β4BADNEWSij + β5AFSOFINVij + β6CONTRACTij  
              + β7LOANRISKij + β8EXPOSUREDERij + β9CREDITRISKDERij + β10NONINTCHGij + β11SIZEij + β12LEVERAGEij + β13DROEij  
              + β14NIEFFj + β15DROE_NIEFFij + β16MKTHERFij + β17CULTUREij + β18DISCLOSUREj + β19REG_POSj + β20REG_UNj + β21PAGEj + εij 
EARLY is an indicator variable that equals 1 if BHCs early adopted accounting standards and 0 otherwise. YEAR is a year indicator variable. NIM is measured by 
the net interest income (BHCK4074) scaled by total assets (BHCK2170) at the first quarter-end after the adoption of a new accounting standard and adjusted for 
the average net interest margin of peer banks. RPCERTAINTY is the percentage of times that a bank’s net interest margin is greater than the average net interest 
margin of peer banks during the past 12 quarters before the standard announcement dates. BADNEWS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if NIM is less than zero 
and 0 otherwise. AFSOFINV is the proportion of available-for-sale securities out of total investment securities and is computed as 
BHCK1773÷(BHCK1773+BHCK1754), adjusted for the average AFSOFINV of peer banks. CONTRACT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a BHC holds 
interest rate derivative contracts and 0 otherwise. LOANRISK is the ratio of the allowance for loan and lease losses at the quarter-end (BHCK3123) to average 
quarterly loans and leases (BHCK3516), adjusted for the average LOANRISK of peer banks. EXPOSUREDER is measured by the ratio of the gross notional 
amount of derivative contracts other than purchased options (i.e. futures contracts, forward contracts, written options, and swaps) to total assets, adjusted for the 
average EXPOSUREDER of peer banks. CREDITRISKDER is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the gross notional amount of over-the-counter derivative 
contracts is greater than that of exchange-traded derivative contracts and 0 otherwise. NONINTCHG is the average quarterly growth in noninterest income 
(BHCK4079) over the past six quarters, adjusted for the average NONINTCHG of peer banks during the same period. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the sum of 
total interest income (BHCK4107) and total noninterest income (BHCK4079). LEVERAGE is total liabilities (BHCK2948) divided by total assets (BHCK2170). 
DROE is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a BHC’s ROE falls in the highest or lowest quartiles of the ROE distribution for the sample BHCs during a 
benchmark quarter and 0 otherwise. NIEFF is coded as 1 if adoption of a sample accounting standard is expected to have a positive effect on income, -1 if a 
negative effect on income is expected and 0 if either a positive, a negative or no direct effect on income is possible. DROE_NIEFF is an interaction term between 
DROE and NIEFF. MKTHERF is measured by the sum of the squared market shares (based on total interest income and total noninterest income) of banks 
operating in the same geographic region; five geographic regions are identified: Eastern, Southeast, Midwest, Southwest, and West. CULTURE is measured by 
the percentage of times that a bank chose early adoption before making the current early-adoption decision on a new accounting standard. DISCLOSURE is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if an accounting standard only requires disclosure and 0 otherwise. REG_POS (REG_UN) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
the pronouncement of an accounting standard could lead to changes in the rule of Tier 1 capital calculation and a positive effect (an undetermined effect) on Tier 
1 capital; 0 otherwise. PAGE is the number of pages of a sample accounting standard as issued. 
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Table 5. Early-Adoption Decision Model by the Income Effects of Accounting Standards 
Independent 
Expected 
Accounting Standards with Income-
decreasing Effects Expected 
Accounting Standards with Income-
increasing Effects 
Variable Sign Coeff. %StdX z-stat. p-value Sign Coeff. %StdX z-stat. p-value 
Hypothesis 1: 
  
NIM − 13.440 5.000 0.102 0.460 − -600.633 -64.900 -1.660 0.049 
RPCERTAINTY + 2.348 120.300 1.685 0.046 + 0.579 21.900 0.648 0.259 
NIM_RPCERTAINTY + 174.600 44.100 0.762 0.223 + 188.600 22.100 0.342 0.366 
BADNEWS − 0.238 12.600 0.180 0.429 − -1.761 -58.600 -1.967 0.025 
Hypothesis 2: 
AFSOFINV − -0.560 -11.800 -0.420 0.337 − -0.416 -9.400 -0.384 0.351 
CONTRACT ? 0.608 32.700 0.525 0.600 ? -1.413 -48.300 -1.248 0.212 
LOANRISK − -318.683 -84.000 -1.878 0.030 − 24.210 11.400 0.313 0.378 
EXPOSUREDER + 0.313 76.600 0.309 0.379 + -2.750 -99.400 -1.427 0.077 
CREDITRISKDER + 0.287 14.300 0.254 0.400 + 1.739 125.500 1.275 0.101 
NONINTCHG + -13.720 -80.000 -2.543 0.006 + 0.508 3.600 0.082 0.468 
Control Variables: 
SIZE ? -1.718 -93.900 -2.584 0.010 ? 0.595 167.400 2.195 0.028 
LEVERAGE ? 44.080 275.300 2.296 0.022 ? 39.700 88.000 1.133 0.257 
DROE + -0.495 -22.000 -0.468 0.320 − -0.933 -37.300 -1.416 0.079 
MKTHERF ? -6.091 -34.500 -1.139 0.255 ? -15.610 -67.100 -1.992 0.046 
CULTURE + -2.468 -34.000 -0.630 0.264 + 2.213 34.000 1.787 0.037 
N 875 287 
Pseudo R2   0.30         0.38       
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Table 5 (cont.) 
Independent 
Expected 
Accounting Standards with Ex Ante 
Undetermined Income Effects Expected 
Accounting Standards with Only Disclosure 
Requirements 
Variable Sign Coeff. %StdX z-stat. p-value Sign Coeff. %StdX z-stat. p-value 
Hypothesis 1: 
  
NIM − -301.984 -46.000 -2.715 0.004 − -478.519 -60.800 -3.377 0.001 
RPCERTAINTY + -0.190 -6.300 -0.382 0.352 + -1.676 -44.100 -2.168 0.015 
NIM_RPCERTAINTY + 342.400 56.600 2.413 0.008 + 601.800 108.600 3.525 0.000 
BADNEWS − -0.525 -22.500 -1.489 0.069 − -1.380 -48.800 -2.256 0.012 
Hypothesis 2: 
AFSOFINV − -1.299 -24.700 -2.987 0.002 − -0.475 -9.500 -0.521 0.301 
CONTRACT ? 0.717 41.600 2.771 0.006 ? 2.249 207.400 4.309 0.000 
LOANRISK − -17.420 -6.600 -0.454 0.325 − -94.110 -31.700 -2.164 0.015 
EXPOSUREDER + 0.128 33.200 2.135 0.017 + 0.039 9.300 0.909 0.182 
CREDITRISKDER + -0.152 -7.300 -0.559 0.288 + -0.091 -4.400 -0.177 0.430 
NONINTCHG + -3.617 -24.200 -1.901 0.029 + 0.369 38.000 5.919 0.000 
Control Variables: 
SIZE ? -0.039 -6.200 -0.331 0.741 ? -0.109 -15.900 -0.727 0.467 
LEVERAGE ? -10.990 -21.500 -2.317 0.021 ? -11.920 -22.700 -1.505 0.132 
DROE ? 0.080 4.100 0.321 0.748 ? -0.253 -11.900 -0.595 0.552 
MKTHERF ? -0.243 -2.000 -0.143 0.886 ? 6.149 82.900 2.747 0.006 
CULTURE + 0.820 12.600 1.453 0.073 + 4.927 58.500 2.810 0.003 
N 1,343 858 
Pseudo R2   0.09         0.24       
Note: The p-values are based on one-tailed tests when the prediction is directional, and on two-tailed tests otherwise. This table reports the results of estimating 
the following model using logit regression with heteroskedasticity-corrected robust standard errors: 
EARLYij = β0 + β1NIMij + β2RPCERTAINTYij + β3NIM_RPCERTAINTYij + β4BADNEWSij + β5AFSOFINVij + β6CONTRACTij + β7LOANRISKij  
+ β8EXPOSUREDERij + β9CREDITRISKDERij + β10NONINTCHGij + β11SIZEij + β12LEVERAGEij + β13DROEij + β14MKTHERFij  
+ β15CULTUREij + εij 
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EARLY is an indicator variable that equals 1 if BHCs early adopted accounting standards and 0 otherwise. NIM is measured by the net interest income 
(BHCK4074) scaled by total assets (BHCK2170) at the first quarter-end after the adoption of a new accounting standard and adjusted for the average net interest 
margin of peer banks. RPCERTAINTY is the percentage of times that a bank’s net interest margin is greater than the average net interest margin of peer banks 
during the past 12 quarters before the standard announcement dates. BADNEWS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if NIM is less than zero and 0 otherwise. 
AFSOFINV is the proportion of available-for-sale securities out of total investment securities and is computed as BHCK1773÷(BHCK1773+BHCK1754), 
adjusted for the average AFSOFINV of peer banks. CONTRACT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a BHC holds interest rate derivative contracts and 0 
otherwise. LOANRISK is the ratio of the allowance for loan and lease losses at the quarter-end (BHCK3123) to average quarterly loans and leases (BHCK3516), 
adjusted for the average LOANRISK of peer banks. EXPOSUREDER is measured by the ratio of the gross notional amount of derivative contracts other than 
purchased options (i.e. futures contracts, forward contracts, written options, and swaps) to total assets, adjusted for the average EXPOSUREDER of peer banks. 
CREDITRISKDER is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the gross notional amount of over-the-counter derivative contracts is greater than that of exchange-
traded derivative contracts and 0 otherwise. NONINTCHG is the average quarterly growth in noninterest income (BHCK4079) over the past six quarters, adjusted 
for the average NONINTCHG of peer banks during the same period. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the sum of total interest income (BHCK4107) and total 
noninterest income (BHCK4079). LEVERAGE is total liabilities (BHCK2948) divided by total assets (BHCK2170). DROE is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if a BHC’s ROE falls in the highest or lowest quartiles of the ROE distribution for the sample BHCs during a benchmark quarter and 0 otherwise. MKTHERF is 
measured by the sum of the squared market shares (based on total interest income and total noninterest income) of banks operating in the same geographic region; 
five geographic regions are identified: Eastern, Southeast, Midwest, Southwest, and West. CULTURE is measured by the percentage of times that a bank chose 
early adoption before making the current early-adoption decision on a new accounting standard.  
Accounting standards with income-decreasing effect include SFAS No. 121, SFAS No. 123, SFAS No. 143, SFAS No. 144, and SFAS No. 123R. Accounting 
standards with income-increasing effect include SFAS No. 122 and SFAS No. 146. Accounting standards with undetermined income effect include SFAS No. 
133, SFAS No. 142, SFAS No. 155, SFAS No. 156, and SFAS No. 159. Accounting standards with disclosure requirements include SFAS No. 132, SFAS No. 
132R, SFAS No. 157, and SFAS No. 161. 
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Table 6. Additional Analysis  
Panel A. Early-Adoption Decision Model by Bank Size 
Independent Expected Small BHCs Mid-sized BHCs Large BHCs 
Variable Sign Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Hypothesis 1: 
NIM − -213.381 0.045 -668.938 0.000 325.900 0.087 
RPCERTAINTY + -0.217 0.373 -0.505 0.261 -1.543 0.082 
NIM_RPCERTAINTY + 487.900 0.005 527.900 0.015 -420.230 0.180 
BADNEWS − -0.424 0.175 -1.508 0.004 -0.779 0.148 
Hypothesis 2: 
AFSOFINV − -0.851 0.045 -1.270 0.054 -1.063 0.244 
CONTRACT ? 0.581 0.180 1.150 0.011 1.118 0.226 
LOANRISK − -80.340 0.100 -63.900 0.130 -216.001 0.008 
EXPOSUREDER + -18.230 0.061 -12.000 0.015 0.051 0.107 
CREDITRISKDER + 0.619 0.115 0.329 0.236 
NONINTCHG + -5.970 0.006 0.485 0.000 -11.280 0.003 
Control Variables: 
SIZE ? -0.081 0.832 -0.066 0.860 0.895 0.001 
LEVERAGE ? 4.690 0.244 -4.832 0.580 -22.200 0.314 
DROE ? -0.309 0.425 0.561 0.140 -0.040 0.930 
NIEFF + -15.330 0.000 2.686 0.006 2.292 0.000 
DROE_NIEFF − -0.285 0.353 -1.535 0.047 0.095 0.463 
MKTHERF ? -0.024 0.994 6.908 0.009 0.453 0.922 
CULTURE + 0.980 0.226 3.549 0.016 0.914 0.203 
DISCLOSURE − 0.873 0.139 -0.063 0.416 0.327 0.178 
REG_POS + 31.590 0.000 4.089 0.001 4.566 0.000 
REG_UN − -3.029 0.035 -15.230 0.000 0.574 0.121 
PAGE − -0.016 0.123 -0.002 0.416 0.016 0.000 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,643 1,325 395 
# of clusters 336 215 49 
Pseudo R2   0.27   0.34   0.37   
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Table 6 (cont.) 
Panel B. Standard Complexity 
Independent Expected Small BHCs Mid-sized BHCs Large BHCs 
Variable Sign Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Hypothesis 1: 
NIM − -197.679 0.040 -662.671 0.000 274.000 0.138 
RPCERTAINTY + -0.252 0.352 -0.533 0.251 -1.417 0.106 
NIM_RPCERTAINTY + 460.800 0.003 508.800 0.018 -331.699 0.272 
BADNEWS − -0.424 0.173 -1.497 0.004 -0.704 0.191 
Hypothesis 2: 
AFSOFINV − -0.857 0.043 -1.265 0.060 -0.946 0.256 
CONTRACT ? 0.603 0.165 1.159 0.010 1.203 0.181 
LOANRISK − -79.470 0.102 -67.560 0.114 -191.289 0.017 
EXPOSUREDER + -19.050 0.059 -12.640 0.013 0.052 0.095 
CREDITRISKDER + 0.624 0.113 0.322 0.239 
NONINTCHG + -5.850 0.006 0.497 0.000 -11.080 0.002 
Control Variables: 
SIZE ? -0.065 0.867 0.007 0.985 0.808 0.001 
LEVERAGE ? 4.675 0.240 -4.721 0.585 -24.360 0.276 
DROE ? -0.316 0.411 0.529 0.166 -0.020 0.966 
NIEFF + -14.400 0.000 2.359 0.005 2.220 0.000 
DROE_NIEFF − -0.283 0.353 -1.379 0.052 0.018 0.494 
MKTHERF ? 0.105 0.974 7.422 0.005 0.818 0.859 
CULTURE + 1.002 0.231 3.512 0.016 0.851 0.225 
DISCLOSURE − 1.733 0.081 0.512 0.143 -0.012 0.488 
REG_POS + 18.270 0.000 3.907 0.001 4.948 0.000 
REG_UN − -14.920 0.000 -16.480 0.000 0.985 0.010 
LOWCOMPLEX + 11.800 0.000 -0.031 0.490 -0.472 0.246 
HIGHCOMPLEX − -1.673 0.080 -0.485 0.245 1.254 0.003 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,643 1,325 395 
# of clusters 336 215 49 
Pseudo R-Squared   0.26   0.34   0.37   
 Note: The p-values are based on one-tailed tests when the prediction is directional, and on two-tailed tests otherwise. 
Panel A reports the results of estimating the following model for small, mid-sized, and large banks using logit 
regression with standard errors clustered at the bank level. 
EARLYij = ∑ β0N
9
N=1 YEARNi + β1NIMij + β2RPCERTAINTYij + β3NIM_RPCERTAINTYij + β4BADNEWSij  
+ β5AFSOFINVij + β6CONTRACTij + β7LOANRISKij + β8EXPOSUREDERij  
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+ β9CREDITRISKDERij + β10NONINTCHGij + β11SIZEij + β12LEVERAGEij + β13DROEij  
+ β14NIEFFj + β15DROE_NIEFFij + β16MKTHERFij + β17CULTUREij + β18DISCLOSUREj  
+ β19REG_POSj + β20REG_UNj + β21PAGEj + εij 
Panel B reports the results of estimating the following model for small, mid-sized, and large banks using logit 
regression with standard errors clustered at the bank level. 
EARLYij = ∑ β0N
9
N=1 YEARNi + β1NIMij + β2RPCERTAINTYij + β3NIM_RPCERTAINTYij + β4BADNEWSij  
+ β5AFSOFINVij + β6CONTRACTij + β7LOANRISKij + β8EXPOSUREDERij  
+ β9CREDITRISKDERij + β10NONINTCHGij + β11SIZEij + β12LEVERAGEij + β13DROEij  
+ β14NIEFFj + β15DROE_NIEFFij + β16MKTHERFij + β17CULTUREij + β18DISCLOSUREj  
+ β19REG_POSj + β20REG_UNj + β21LOWCOMPLEXj + β22HIGHCOMPLEXj + εij 
EARLY is an indicator variable that equals 1 if BHCs early adopted accounting standards and 0 otherwise. YEAR is a 
year indicator variable. NIM is measured by the net interest income (BHCK4074) scaled by total assets (BHCK2170) 
at the first quarter-end after the adoption of a new accounting standard and adjusted for the average net interest 
margin of peer banks. RPCERTAINTY is the percentage of times that a bank’s net interest margin is greater than the 
average net interest margin of peer banks during the past 12 quarters before the standard announcement dates. 
BADNEWS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if NIM is less than zero and 0 otherwise. AFSOFINV is the proportion 
of available-for-sale securities out of total investment securities and is computed as 
BHCK1773÷(BHCK1773+BHCK1754), adjusted for the average AFSOFINV of peer banks. CONTRACT is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if a BHC holds interest rate derivative contracts and 0 otherwise. LOANRISK is the ratio 
of the allowance for loan and lease losses at the quarter-end (BHCK3123) to average quarterly loans and leases 
(BHCK3516), adjusted for the average LOANRISK of peer banks. EXPOSUREDER is measured by the ratio of the 
gross notional amount of derivative contracts other than purchased options (i.e. futures contracts, forward contracts, 
written options, and swaps) to total assets, adjusted for the average EXPOSUREDER of peer banks. 
CREDITRISKDER is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the gross notional amount of over-the-counter derivative 
contracts is greater than that of exchange-traded derivative contracts and 0 otherwise. NONINTCHG is the average 
quarterly growth in noninterest income (BHCK4079) over the past six quarters, adjusted for the average 
NONINTCHG of peer banks during the same period. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the sum of total interest 
income (BHCK4107) and total noninterest income (BHCK4079). LEVERAGE is total liabilities (BHCK2948) 
divided by total assets (BHCK2170). DROE is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a BHC’s ROE falls in the 
highest or lowest quartiles of the ROE distribution for the sample BHCs during a benchmark quarter and 0 otherwise. 
NIEFF is coded as 1 if adoption of a sample accounting standard is expected to have a positive effect on income, -1 
if a negative effect on income is expected and 0 if either a positive, a negative or no direct effect on income is 
possible. DROE_NIEFF is an interaction term between DROE and NIEFF. MKTHERF is measured by the sum of 
the squared market shares (based on total interest income and total noninterest income) of banks operating in the 
same geographic region; five geographic regions are identified: Eastern, Southeast, Midwest, Southwest, and West. 
CULTURE is measured by the percentage of times that a bank chose early adoption before making the current early-
adoption decision on a new accounting standard. DISCLOSURE is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an 
accounting standard only requires disclosure and 0 otherwise. REG_POS (REG_UN) is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the pronouncement of an accounting standard could lead to changes in the rule of Tier 1 capital 
calculation and a positive effect (an undetermined effect) on Tier 1 capital; 0 otherwise. PAGE is the number of 
pages of a sample accounting standard as issued. LOWCOMPLEX is an indicator variable which equals 1 if early-
adoption decisions are on SFAS No. 122, SFAS No. 132, SFAS No. 146, SFAS No. 155, or SFAS No. 161, and 0 
otherwise. HIGHCOMPLEX is an indicator variable which equals 1 if early-adoption decisions are on SFAS No. 
123, SFAS No. 133, SFAS No. 123R, SFAS No. 156, or SFAS No. 157, and 0 otherwise. 
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Figure 1. Comparison between Early and Matched Late Bank Adopters in the Growth of Funds  
(a) Banks’ Financing Activities during Economic 
Expansion 
(b) Banks’ Financing Activities during Economic 
Contraction 
 
This figure displays the financing activities of early bank adopters and matched late adopters between the issued dates and the effective dates of accounting 
standards (i.e., the testing periods). Banks’ financing activities include changes in deposits, liabilities other than deposits, and preferred and common stock. For 
each early bank adopter of an accounting standard, a late bank adopter is matched correspondingly based on bank profitability (i.e., net interest margin). Panel a 
(Panel b) exhibits the early and late bank adopters’ financing activities in the testing periods when the economy was in expansion (contraction). Definitions of 
economic expansions and contractions are available on the NBER website (http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html). The comparison of the total growth of 
funds acquired between early and matched late bank adopters is not statistically significant in any case. In contrast, the comparisons of the growth of liabilities 
other than deposits between early and matched late bank adopters are statistically significant in the cases of the adoption of FAS 122, FAS 133, FAS 156, and 
FAS 157 (paired t-test, one-tailed p-value = 0.05, 0.05, 0.07, and 0.02, respectively). 
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